feat: exec policy integration in shell mcp (#7609)

adding execpolicy support into the `posix` mcp

Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
This commit is contained in:
zhao-oai
2025-12-04 21:55:54 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 4c9762d15c
commit b1c918d8f7
6 changed files with 171 additions and 41 deletions

View File

@@ -57,8 +57,17 @@
//!
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use anyhow::Context as _;
use clap::Parser;
use codex_core::config::find_codex_home;
use codex_core::is_dangerous_command::command_might_be_dangerous;
use codex_execpolicy::Decision;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use codex_execpolicy::RuleMatch;
use rmcp::ErrorData as McpError;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
use tracing_subscriber::{self};
@@ -87,6 +96,11 @@ struct McpServerCli {
/// Path to Bash that has been patched to support execve() wrapping.
#[arg(long = "bash")]
bash_path: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Preserve program paths when applying execpolicy (e.g., keep /usr/bin/echo instead of echo).
/// Note: this does change the actual program being run.
#[arg(long)]
preserve_program_paths: bool,
}
#[tokio::main]
@@ -113,13 +127,19 @@ pub async fn main_mcp_server() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
Some(path) => path,
None => mcp::get_bash_path()?,
};
let policy = Arc::new(RwLock::new(load_exec_policy().await?));
tracing::info!("Starting MCP server");
let service = mcp::serve(bash_path, execve_wrapper, dummy_exec_policy)
.await
.inspect_err(|e| {
tracing::error!("serving error: {:?}", e);
})?;
let service = mcp::serve(
bash_path,
execve_wrapper,
policy,
cli.preserve_program_paths,
)
.await
.inspect_err(|e| {
tracing::error!("serving error: {:?}", e);
})?;
service.waiting().await?;
Ok(())
@@ -146,26 +166,116 @@ pub async fn main_execve_wrapper() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
std::process::exit(exit_code);
}
// TODO: replace with execpolicy
/// Decide how to handle an exec() call for a specific command.
///
/// `file` is the absolute, canonical path to the executable to run, i.e. the first arg to exec.
/// `argv` is the argv, including the program name (`argv[0]`).
pub(crate) fn evaluate_exec_policy(
policy: &Policy,
file: &Path,
argv: &[String],
preserve_program_paths: bool,
) -> Result<ExecPolicyOutcome, McpError> {
let program_name = format_program_name(file, preserve_program_paths).ok_or_else(|| {
McpError::internal_error(
format!("failed to format program name for `{}`", file.display()),
None,
)
})?;
let command: Vec<String> = std::iter::once(program_name)
// Use the normalized program name instead of argv[0].
.chain(argv.iter().skip(1).cloned())
.collect();
let evaluation = policy.check(&command, &|cmd| {
if command_might_be_dangerous(cmd) {
Decision::Prompt
} else {
Decision::Allow
}
});
fn dummy_exec_policy(file: &Path, argv: &[String], _workdir: &Path) -> ExecPolicyOutcome {
if file.ends_with("rm") {
ExecPolicyOutcome::Forbidden
} else if file.ends_with("git") {
ExecPolicyOutcome::Prompt {
run_with_escalated_permissions: false,
}
} else if file == Path::new("/opt/homebrew/bin/gh")
&& let [_, arg1, arg2, ..] = argv
&& arg1 == "issue"
&& arg2 == "list"
{
ExecPolicyOutcome::Allow {
run_with_escalated_permissions: true,
}
// decisions driven by policy should run outside sandbox
let decision_driven_by_policy = evaluation.matched_rules.iter().any(|rule_match| {
!matches!(rule_match, RuleMatch::HeuristicsRuleMatch { .. })
&& rule_match.decision() == evaluation.decision
});
Ok(match evaluation.decision {
Decision::Forbidden => ExecPolicyOutcome::Forbidden,
Decision::Prompt => ExecPolicyOutcome::Prompt {
run_with_escalated_permissions: decision_driven_by_policy,
},
Decision::Allow => ExecPolicyOutcome::Allow {
run_with_escalated_permissions: decision_driven_by_policy,
},
})
}
fn format_program_name(path: &Path, preserve_program_paths: bool) -> Option<String> {
if preserve_program_paths {
path.to_str().map(str::to_string)
} else {
ExecPolicyOutcome::Allow {
run_with_escalated_permissions: false,
}
path.file_name()?.to_str().map(str::to_string)
}
}
async fn load_exec_policy() -> anyhow::Result<Policy> {
let codex_home = find_codex_home().context("failed to resolve codex_home for execpolicy")?;
codex_core::load_exec_policy(&codex_home)
.await
.map_err(anyhow::Error::from)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use codex_execpolicy::Decision;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::path::Path;
#[test]
fn evaluate_exec_policy_uses_heuristics_for_dangerous_commands() {
let policy = Policy::empty();
let file = Path::new("/bin/rm");
let argv = vec!["rm".to_string(), "-rf".to_string(), "/".to_string()];
let outcome = evaluate_exec_policy(&policy, file, &argv, false).expect("policy evaluation");
assert_eq!(
outcome,
ExecPolicyOutcome::Prompt {
run_with_escalated_permissions: false
}
);
}
#[test]
fn evaluate_exec_policy_respects_preserve_program_paths() {
let mut policy = Policy::empty();
policy
.add_prefix_rule(
&[
"/usr/local/bin/custom-cmd".to_string(),
"--flag".to_string(),
],
Decision::Allow,
)
.expect("policy rule should be added");
let file = Path::new("/usr/local/bin/custom-cmd");
let argv = vec![
"/usr/local/bin/custom-cmd".to_string(),
"--flag".to_string(),
"value".to_string(),
];
let outcome = evaluate_exec_policy(&policy, file, &argv, true).expect("policy evaluation");
assert_eq!(
outcome,
ExecPolicyOutcome::Allow {
run_with_escalated_permissions: true
}
);
}
}