feat: add support for read-only bind mounts in the linux sandbox (#9112)

### Motivation

- Landlock alone cannot prevent writes to sensitive in-repo files like
`.git/` when the repo root is writable, so explicit mount restrictions
are required for those paths.
- The sandbox must set up any mounts before calling Landlock so Landlock
can still be applied afterwards and the two mechanisms compose
correctly.

### Description

- Add a new `linux-sandbox` helper `apply_read_only_mounts` in
`linux-sandbox/src/mounts.rs` that: unshares namespaces, maps uids/gids
when required, makes mounts private, bind-mounts targets, and remounts
them read-only.
- Wire the mount step into the sandbox flow by calling
`apply_read_only_mounts(...)` before network/seccomp and before applying
Landlock rules in `linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs`.
This commit is contained in:
viyatb-oai
2026-01-14 08:30:46 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent bcd7858ced
commit e1447c3009
8 changed files with 676 additions and 13 deletions

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ use codex_core::error::SandboxErr;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use crate::mounts::apply_read_only_mounts;
use landlock::ABI;
use landlock::Access;
use landlock::AccessFs;
@@ -31,6 +33,10 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
) -> Result<()> {
if !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
apply_read_only_mounts(sandbox_policy, cwd)?;
}
if !sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() {
install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread()?;
}