Currently, if there are syntax errors detected in the starlark rules
file, the entire policy is silently ignored by the CLI. The app server
correctly emits a message that can be displayed in a GUI.
This PR changes the CLI (both the TUI and non-interactive exec) to fail
when the rules file can't be parsed. It then prints out an error message
and exits with a non-zero exit code. This is consistent with the
handling of errors in the config file.
This addresses #11603
## Summary
If the model suggests a bad rule, don't show it to the user. This does
not impact the parsing of existing rules, just the ones we show.
## Testing
- [x] Added unit tests
- [x] Ran locally
### Motivation
- Git subcommand matching was being classified as "dangerous" and caused
benign developer workflows (for example `git push --force-with-lease`)
to be blocked by the preflight policy.
- The change aligns behavior with the intent to reserve the dangerous
checklist for truly destructive shell ops (e.g. `rm -rf`) and avoid
surprising developer-facing blocks.
### Description
- Remove git-specific subcommand checks from
`is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec` in
`codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs`,
leaving only explicit `rm` and `sudo` passthrough checks.
- Deleted the git-specific helper logic that classified `reset`,
`branch`-delete, `push` (force/delete/refspec) and `clean --force` as
dangerous.
- Updated unit tests in the same file to assert that various `git
reset`/`git branch`/`git push`/`git clean` variants are no longer
classified as dangerous.
- Kept `find_git_subcommand` (used by safe-command classification)
intact so safe/unsafe parsing elsewhere remains functional.
### Testing
- Ran formatter with `just fmt` successfully.
- Ran unit tests with `cargo test -p codex-shell-command` and all tests
passed (`144 passed; 0 failed`).
------
[Codex
Task](https://chatgpt.com/codex/tasks/task_i_698d19dedb4883299c3ceb5bbc6a0dcf)
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
not express a narrower read surface.
This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
current behavior today.
It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
## What
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
- `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
- Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
related tests.
- Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
- Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
(`UnsupportedOperation`).
- Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
## Compatibility / rollout
- Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
- API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
## Summary
This should rarely, if ever, happen in practice. But regardless, we
should never provide an empty list of `commands` to ExecPolicy. This PR
is almost entirely adding test around these cases.
## Testing
- [x] Adds a bunch of unit tests for this
## Summary
- Reduced repeated approvals for equivalent wrapper commands and fixed
execpolicy matching for heredoc-style shell invocations, with minimal
behavior change and fail-closed defaults.
## Fixes
1. Canonicalized approval matching for wrappers so equivalent commands
map to the same approval intent.
2. Added heredoc-aware prefix extraction for execpolicy so commands like
`python3 <<'PY' ... PY` match rules such as `prefix_rule(["python3"],
...)`.
3. Kept fallback behavior conservative: if parsing is ambiguous,
existing prompt behavior is preserved.
## Edge Cases Covered
- Wrapper path/name differences: `/bin/bash` vs `bash`, `/bin/zsh` vs
`zsh`.
- Shell modes: `-c` and `-lc`.
- Heredoc forms: quoted delimiter (`<<'PY'`) and unquoted delimiter (`<<
PY`).
- Multi-command heredoc scripts are rejected by the fallback
- Non-heredoc redirections (`>`, etc.) are not treated as heredoc prefix
matches.
- Complex scripts still fall back to prior behavior rather than
expanding permissions.
---------
Co-authored-by: Dylan Hurd <dylan.hurd@openai.com>
fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/10160 and some more.
## Description
Hardens Git command safety to prevent approval bypasses for destructive
or write-capable invocations (branch delete, risky push forms,
output/config-override flags), so these commands no longer auto-run as
“safe.”
- `git branch -d` variants (especially in worktrees / with global
options like -C / -c)
- `git show|diff|log --output` ... style file-write flags
- risky Git config override flags (-c, --config-env) that can trigger
external execution
- dangerous push forms that weren’t fully caught (`--force*`,
`--delete`, `+refspec`, `:refspec`)
- grouped short-flag delete forms (e.g. stacked branch flags containing
`d/D`)
will fast follow with a common git policy to bring windows to parity.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
`requirements.toml` should be able to specify rules which always run.
My intention here was that these rules could only ever be restrictive,
which means the decision can be "prompt" or "forbidden" but never
"allow". A requirement of "you must always allow this command" didn't
make sense to me, but happy to be gaveled otherwise.
Rules already applies the most restrictive decision, so we can safely
merge these with rules found in other config folders.
When an invalid config.toml key or value is detected, the CLI currently
just quits. This leaves the VSCE in a dead state.
This PR changes the behavior to not quit and bubble up the config error
to users to make it actionable. It also surfaces errors related to
"rules" parsing.
This allows us to surface these errors to users in the VSCE, like this:
<img width="342" height="129" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-13 at 4 29 22 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a79ffbe7-7604-400c-a304-c5165b6eebc4"
/>
<img width="346" height="244" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-13 at 4 45 06 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/de874f7c-16a2-4a95-8c6d-15f10482e67b"
/>
Adds an optional `justification` parameter to the `prefix_rule()`
execpolicy DSL so policy authors can attach human-readable rationale to
a rule. That justification is propagated through parsing/matching and
can be surfaced to the model (or approval UI) when a command is blocked
or requires approval.
When a command is rejected (or gated behind approval) due to policy, a
generic message makes it hard for the model/user to understand what went
wrong and what to do instead. Allowing policy authors to supply a short
justification improves debuggability and helps guide the model toward
compliant alternatives.
Example:
```python
prefix_rule(
pattern = ["git", "push"],
decision = "forbidden",
justification = "pushing is blocked in this repo",
)
```
If Codex tried to run `git push origin main`, now the failure would
include:
```
`git push origin main` rejected: pushing is blocked in this repo
```
whereas previously, all it was told was:
```
execpolicy forbids this command
```
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8354 added support for in-repo
`.config/` files, so this PR updates the logic for loading `*.rules`
files to load `*.rules` files from all relevant layers. The main change
to the business logic is `load_exec_policy()` in
`codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs`.
Note this adds a `config_folder()` method to `ConfigLayerSource` that
returns `Option<AbsolutePathBuf>` so that it is straightforward to
iterate over the sources and get the associated config folder, if any.
We decided that `*.rules` is a more fitting (and concise) file extension
than `*.codexpolicy`, so we are changing the file extension for the
"execpolicy" effort. We are also changing the subfolder of `$CODEX_HOME`
from `policy` to `rules` to match.
This PR updates the in-repo docs and we will update the public docs once
the next CLI release goes out.
Locally, I created `~/.codex/rules/default.rules` with the following
contents:
```
prefix_rule(pattern=["gh", "pr", "view"])
```
And then I asked Codex to run:
```
gh pr view 7888 --json title,body,comments
```
and it was able to!
Currently, we only show the “don’t ask again for commands that start
with…” option when a command is immediately flagged as needing approval.
However, there is another case where we ask for approval: When a command
is initially auto-approved to run within sandbox, but it fails to run
inside sandbox, we would like to attempt to retry running outside of
sandbox. This will require a prompt to the user.
This PR addresses this latter case
The caller should decide whether wrapping the policy in `Arc<RwLock>` is
necessary. This should make https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/7609 a
bit smoother.
- `exec_policy_for()` -> `load_exec_policy_for_features()`
- introduce `load_exec_policy()` that does not take `Features` as an arg
- both return `Result<Policy, ExecPolicyError>` instead of
Result<Arc<RwLock<Policy>>, ExecPolicyError>`
This simplifies the tests as they have no need for `Arc<RwLock>`.
## Refactor of the `execpolicy` crate
To illustrate why we need this refactor, consider an agent attempting to
run `apple | rm -rf ./`. Suppose `apple` is allowed by `execpolicy`.
Before this PR, `execpolicy` would consider `apple` and `pear` and only
render one rule match: `Allow`. We would skip any heuristics checks on
`rm -rf ./` and immediately approve `apple | rm -rf ./` to run.
To fix this, we now thread a `fallback` evaluation function into
`execpolicy` that runs when no `execpolicy` rules match a given command.
In our example, we would run `fallback` on `rm -rf ./` and prevent
`apple | rm -rf ./` from being run without approval.
this PR enables TUI to approve commands and add their prefixes to an
allowlist:
<img width="708" height="605" alt="Screenshot 2025-11-21 at 4 18 07 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/56a19893-4553-4770-a881-becf79eeda32"
/>
note: we only show the option to whitelist the command when
1) command is not multi-part (e.g `git add -A && git commit -m 'hello
world'`)
2) command is not already matched by an existing rule
I think this might help with https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/7033
because `create_approval_requirement_for_command()` will soon need
access to `Session.state`, which is a `tokio::sync::Mutex` that needs to
be accessed via `async`.
adding execpolicycheck tool onto codex cli
this is useful for validating policies (can be multiple) against
commands.
it will also surface errors in policy syntax:
<img width="1150" height="281" alt="Screenshot 2025-11-19 at 12 46
21 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f99b403-564c-4172-acc9-6574a8d13dc3"
/>
this PR also changes output format when there's no match in the CLI.
instead of returning the raw string `noMatch`, we return
`{"noMatch":{}}`
this PR is a rewrite of: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/6932 (due
to the numerous merge conflicts present in the original PR)
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
This PR threads execpolicy2 into codex-core.
activated via feature flag: exec_policy (on by default)
reads and parses all .codexpolicy files in `codex_home/codex`
refactored tool runtime API to integrate execpolicy logic
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
