Summary
- capture the origin for each configured MCP server and expose it via
the connection manager
- plumb MCP server name/origin into tool logging and emit
codex.tool_result events with those fields
- add unit coverage for origin parsing and extend OTEL tests to assert
empty MCP fields for non-MCP tools
- currently not logging full urls or url paths to prevent logging
potentially sensitive data
Testing
- Not run (not requested)
## Summary
- add a distinct `linux_bubblewrap` sandbox tag when the Linux
bubblewrap pipeline feature is enabled
- thread the bubblewrap feature flag into sandbox tag generation for:
- turn metadata header emission
- tool telemetry metric tags and after-tool-use hooks
- add focused unit tests for `sandbox_tag` precedence and Linux
bubblewrap behavior
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets`
- `cargo test -p codex-core sandbox_tags::tests`
- started `cargo test -p codex-core` and stopped it per request
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
not express a narrower read surface.
This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
current behavior today.
It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
## What
- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
- `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
- `FullAccess`
- Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
- `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
- Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
- Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
related tests.
- Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
- Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
(`UnsupportedOperation`).
- Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
## Compatibility / rollout
- Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
- API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
# Tool System Refactor
- Centralizes tool definitions and execution in `core/src/tools/*`:
specs (`spec.rs`), handlers (`handlers/*`), router (`router.rs`),
registry/dispatch (`registry.rs`), and shared context (`context.rs`).
One registry now builds the model-visible tool list and binds handlers.
- Router converts model responses to tool calls; Registry dispatches
with consistent telemetry via `codex-rs/otel` and unified error
handling. Function, Local Shell, MCP, and experimental `unified_exec`
all flow through this path; legacy shell aliases still work.
- Rationale: reduce per‑tool boilerplate, keep spec/handler in sync, and
make adding tools predictable and testable.
Example: `read_file`
- Spec: `core/src/tools/spec.rs` (see `create_read_file_tool`,
registered by `build_specs`).
- Handler: `core/src/tools/handlers/read_file.rs` (absolute `file_path`,
1‑indexed `offset`, `limit`, `L#: ` prefixes, safe truncation).
- E2E test: `core/tests/suite/read_file.rs` validates the tool returns
the requested lines.
## Next steps:
- Decompose `handle_container_exec_with_params`
- Add parallel tool calls
