Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Bolin
2ef91b7140 chore: move pty and windows sandbox to Rust 2024 (#15954)
## Why

`codex-utils-pty` and `codex-windows-sandbox` were the remaining crates
in `codex-rs` that still overrode the workspace's Rust 2024 edition.
Moving them forward in a separate PR keeps the baseline edition update
isolated from the follow-on Bazel clippy workflow in #15955, while
making linting and formatting behavior consistent with the rest of the
workspace.

This PR also needs Cargo and Bazel to agree on the edition for
`codex-windows-sandbox`. Without the Bazel-side sync, the experimental
Bazel app-server builds fail once they compile `windows-sandbox-rs`.

## What changed

- switch `codex-rs/utils/pty` and `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` to
`edition = "2024"`
- update `codex-utils-pty` callsites and tests to use the collapsed `if
let` form that Clippy expects under the new edition
- fix the Rust 2024 fallout in `windows-sandbox-rs`, including the
reserved `gen` identifier, `unsafe extern` requirements, and new Clippy
findings that surfaced under the edition bump
- keep the edition bump separate from a larger unsafe cleanup by
temporarily allowing `unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn` in the Windows entrypoint
modules that now report it under Rust 2024
- update `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/BUILD.bazel` to `crate_edition =
"2024"` so Bazel compiles the crate with the same edition as Cargo





---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/15954).
* #15976
* #15955
* __->__ #15954
2026-03-27 02:31:08 -07:00
viyatb-oai
81fa04783a feat(windows-sandbox): add network proxy support (#12220)
## Summary

This PR makes Windows sandbox proxying enforceable by routing proxy-only
runs through the existing `offline` sandbox user and reserving direct
network access for the existing `online` sandbox user.

In brief:

- if a Windows sandbox run should be proxy-enforced, we run it as the
`offline` user
- the `offline` user gets firewall rules that block direct outbound
traffic and only permit the configured localhost proxy path
- if a Windows sandbox run should have true direct network access, we
run it as the `online` user
- no new sandbox identity is introduced

This brings Windows in line with the intended model: proxy use is not
just env-based, it is backed by OS-level egress controls. Windows
already has two sandbox identities:

- `offline`: intended to have no direct network egress
- `online`: intended to have full network access

This PR makes proxy-enforced runs use that model directly.

### Proxy-enforced runs

When proxy enforcement is active:

- the run is assigned to the `offline` identity
- setup extracts the loopback proxy ports from the sandbox env
- Windows setup programs firewall rules for the `offline` user that:
  - block all non-loopback outbound traffic
  - block loopback UDP
  - block loopback TCP except for the configured proxy ports
- optionally allow broader localhost access when `allow_local_binding=1`

So the sandboxed process can only talk to the local proxy. It cannot
open direct outbound sockets or do local UDP-based DNS on its own.The
proxy then performs the real outbound network access outside that
restricted sandbox identity.

### Direct-network runs

When proxy enforcement is not active and full network access is allowed:

- the run is assigned to the `online` identity
- no proxy-only firewall restrictions are applied
- the process gets normal direct network access

### Unelevated vs elevated

The restricted-token / unelevated path cannot enforce per-identity
firewall policy by itself.

So for Windows proxy-enforced runs, we transparently use the logon-user
sandbox path under the hood, even if the caller started from the
unelevated mode. That keeps enforcement real instead of best-effort.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-26 17:27:38 -07:00
iceweasel-oai
9f79365691 error code/msg details for failed elevated setup (#9941) 2026-01-27 23:06:10 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
0e4adcd760 use machine scope instead of user scope for dpapi. (#9713)
This fixes a bug where the elevated sandbox setup encrypts sandbox user
passwords as an admin user, but normal command execution attempts to
decrypt them as a different user.

Machine scope allows all users to encyrpt/decrypt

this PR also moves the encrypted file to a different location
.codex/.sandbox-secrets which the sandbox users cannot read.
2026-01-22 16:40:13 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
9ea8e3115e lookup system SIDs instead of hardcoding English strings. (#9552)
The elevated setup does not work on non-English windows installs where
Users/Administrators/etc are in different languages. This PR uses the
well-known SIDs instead, which do not vary based on locale
2026-01-20 13:55:37 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
79ce79a62e use a SandboxUsers group for ACLs instead of granting to each sandbox user separately (#8483)
This is more future-proof if we ever decide to add additional Sandbox
Users for new functionality

This also moves some more user-related code into a new file for code
cleanliness
2026-01-02 10:47:26 -08:00