## Why
`argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
`codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
## What changed
- mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
`tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
`--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
- fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
preserved with a single separator
- documented the new default behavior in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
- updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
`--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
additional lint findings in those lanes.
## Validation
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
- `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
- shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
## Follow-up
- Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
- Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Why
This is effectively a follow-up to
[#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.
Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
without changing behavior.
Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.
## What changed
- removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
`skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
protocol
- removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
- updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
plumbing to stop forwarding the field
- cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
`skillMetadata`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Summary
This change adds websocket authentication at the app-server transport
boundary and enforces it before JSON-RPC `initialize`, so authenticated
deployments reject unauthenticated clients during the websocket
handshake rather than after a connection has already been admitted.
During rollout, websocket auth is opt-in for non-loopback listeners so
we do not break existing remote clients. If `--ws-auth ...` is
configured, the server enforces auth during websocket upgrade. If auth
is not configured, non-loopback listeners still start, but app-server
logs a warning and the startup banner calls out that auth should be
configured before real remote use.
The server supports two auth modes: a file-backed capability token, and
a standard HMAC-signed JWT/JWS bearer token verified with the
`jsonwebtoken` crate, with optional issuer, audience, and clock-skew
validation. Capability tokens are normalized, hashed, and compared in
constant time. Short shared secrets for signed bearer tokens are
rejected at startup. Requests carrying an `Origin` header are rejected
with `403` by transport middleware, and authenticated clients present
credentials as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` during websocket upgrade.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server transport::auth`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli app_server_`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
Note: in the broad `cargo test -p codex-app-server
connection_handling_websocket` run, the touched websocket auth cases
passed, but unrelated Unix shutdown tests failed with a timeout in this
environment.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
