Commit Graph

15 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Wiesen
e81f9a3a0b fix: scope windows sandbox capability sids by writable root 2026-03-24 09:30:23 -07:00
Michael Bolin
fa2a2f0be9 Use released DotSlash package for argument-comment lint (#15199)
## Why
The argument-comment lint now has a packaged DotSlash artifact from
[#15198](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15198), so the normal repo
lint path should use that released payload instead of rebuilding the
lint from source every time.

That keeps `just clippy` and CI aligned with the shipped artifact while
preserving a separate source-build path for people actively hacking on
the lint crate.

The current alpha package also exposed two integration wrinkles that the
repo-side prebuilt wrapper needs to smooth over:
- the bundled Dylint library filename includes the host triple, for
example `@nightly-2025-09-18-aarch64-apple-darwin`, and Dylint derives
`RUSTUP_TOOLCHAIN` from that filename
- on Windows, Dylint's driver path also expects `RUSTUP_HOME` to be
present in the environment

Without those adjustments, the prebuilt CI jobs fail during `cargo
metadata` or driver setup. This change makes the checked-in prebuilt
wrapper normalize the packaged library name to the plain
`nightly-2025-09-18` channel before invoking `cargo-dylint`, and it
teaches both the wrapper and the packaged runner source to infer
`RUSTUP_HOME` from `rustup show home` when the environment does not
already provide it.

After the prebuilt Windows lint job started running successfully, it
also surfaced a handful of existing anonymous literal callsites in
`windows-sandbox-rs`. This PR now annotates those callsites so the new
cross-platform lint job is green on the current tree.

## What Changed
- checked in the current
`tools/argument-comment-lint/argument-comment-lint` DotSlash manifest
- kept `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` as the source-build wrapper
for lint development
- added `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` as the
normal enforcement path, using the checked-in DotSlash package and
bundled `cargo-dylint`
- updated `just clippy` and `just argument-comment-lint` to use the
prebuilt wrapper
- split `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` so source-package checks live in
a dedicated `argument_comment_lint_package` job, while the released lint
runs in an `argument_comment_lint_prebuilt` matrix on Linux, macOS, and
Windows
- kept the pinned `nightly-2025-09-18` toolchain install in the prebuilt
CI matrix, since the prebuilt package still relies on rustup-provided
toolchain components
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` to
normalize host-qualified nightly library filenames, keep the `rustup`
shim directory ahead of direct toolchain `cargo` binaries, and export
`RUSTUP_HOME` when needed for Windows Dylint driver setup
- updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/src/bin/argument-comment-lint.rs`
so future published DotSlash artifacts apply the same nightly-filename
normalization and `RUSTUP_HOME` inference internally
- fixed the remaining Windows lint violations in
`codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` by adding the required `/*param*/`
comments at the reported callsites
- documented the checked-in DotSlash file, wrapper split, archive
layout, nightly prerequisite, and Windows `RUSTUP_HOME` requirement in
`tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
2026-03-20 03:19:22 +00:00
iceweasel-oai
639a5f6c48 copy command-runner to CODEX_HOME so sandbox users can always execute it (#13413)
• Keep Windows sandbox runner launches working from packaged installs by
running the helper from a user-owned runtime location.

On some Windows installs, the packaged helper location is difficult to
use reliably for sandboxed runner launches even though the binaries are
present. This change works around that by copying codex-
command-runner.exe into CODEX_HOME/.sandbox-bin/, reusing that copy
across launches, and falling back to the existing packaged-path lookup
if anything goes wrong.

The runtime copy lives in a dedicated directory with tighter ACLs than
.sandbox: sandbox users can read and execute the runner there, but they
cannot modify it. This keeps the workaround focused on the
command runner, leaves the setup helper on its trusted packaged path,
and adds logging so it is clear which runner path was selected at
launch.
2026-03-04 01:31:37 +00:00
Eric Traut
5296e06b61 Protect workspace .agents directory in Windows sandbox (#11970)
The Mac and Linux implementations of the sandbox recently added write
protections for `.codex` and `.agents` subdirectories in all writable
roots. When adding documentation for this, I noticed that this change
was never made for the Windows sandbox.

Summary
- make compute_allow_paths treat .codex/.agents as protected alongside
.git, and cover their behavior in new tests
- wire protect_workspace_agents_dir through the sandbox lib and setup
path to apply deny ACEs when `.agents` exists
- factor shared ACL logic for workspace subdirectories
2026-02-17 09:40:46 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
aabe0f259c implement per-workspace capability SIDs for workspace specific ACLs (#10189)
Today, there is a single capability SID that allows the sandbox to write
to
* workspace (cwd)
* tmp directories if enabled
* additional writable roots

This change splits those up, so that each workspace has its own
capability SID, while tmp and additional roots, which are
installation-wide, are still governed by the "generic" capability SID

This isolates workspaces from each other in terms of sandbox write
access.
Also allows us to protect <cwd>/.codex when codex runs in a specific
<cwd>
2026-02-03 12:37:51 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
9f79365691 error code/msg details for failed elevated setup (#9941) 2026-01-27 23:06:10 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
0e4adcd760 use machine scope instead of user scope for dpapi. (#9713)
This fixes a bug where the elevated sandbox setup encrypts sandbox user
passwords as an admin user, but normal command execution attempts to
decrypt them as a different user.

Machine scope allows all users to encyrpt/decrypt

this PR also moves the encrypted file to a different location
.codex/.sandbox-secrets which the sandbox users cannot read.
2026-01-22 16:40:13 -08:00
viyatb-oai
f89a40a849 chore: upgrade to Rust 1.92.0 (#8860)
**Summary**
- Upgrade Rust toolchain used by CI to 1.92.0.
- Address new clippy `derivable_impls` warnings by deriving `Default`
for enums across protocol, core, backend openapi models, and
windows-sandbox setup.
- Tidy up related test/config behavior (originator header handling, env
override cleanup) and remove a now-unused assignment in TUI/TUI2 render
layout.

**Testing**
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-tui2`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui2`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --test all`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server --test all`
- `cargo test --all-features`
2026-01-16 11:12:52 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
07f077dfb3 best effort to "hide" Sandbox users (#8492)
The elevated sandbox creates two new Windows users - CodexSandboxOffline
and CodexSandboxOnline. This is necessary, so this PR does all that it
can to "hide" those users. It uses the registry plus directory flags (on
their home directories) to get them to show up as little as possible.
2026-01-05 12:29:10 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
720fa67816 better idempotency for creating/updating firewall rules during setup. (#8686)
make sure if the Sandbox has to re-initialize with different Sandbox
user SID, it still finds/updates the firewall rule instead of creating a
new one.
2026-01-05 10:42:33 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
79ce79a62e use a SandboxUsers group for ACLs instead of granting to each sandbox user separately (#8483)
This is more future-proof if we ever decide to add additional Sandbox
Users for new functionality

This also moves some more user-related code into a new file for code
cleanliness
2026-01-02 10:47:26 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
d65fe38b2c use a junction for the cwd while read ACLs are being applied (#8444)
The elevated setup synchronously applies read/write ACLs to any
workspace roots.

However, until we apply *read* permission to the full path, powershell
cannot use some roots as a cwd as it needs access to all parts of the
path in order to apply it as the working directory for a command.

The solution is, while the async read-ACL part of setup is running, use
a "junction" that lives in C:\Users\CodexSandbox{Offline|Online} that
points to the cwd.

Once the read ACLs are applied, we stop using the junction.

-----

this PR also removes some dead code and overly-verbose logging, and has
some light refactoring to the ACL-related functions
2025-12-22 12:23:13 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
25ecd0c2e4 speed and reliability improvements for setting reads ACLs (#8216)
- Batch read ACL creation for online/offline sandbox user
- creates a new ACL helper process that is long-lived and runs in the
background
- uses a mutex so that only one helper process is running at a time.
2025-12-17 15:27:52 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
3d14da9728 bug fixes and perf improvements for elevated sandbox setup (#8094)
a few fixes based on testing feedback:
* ensure cap_sid file is always written by elevated setup.
* always log to same file whether using elevated sandbox or not
* process potentially slow ACE write operations in parallel
* dedupe write roots so we don't double process any
* don't try to create read/write ACEs on the same directories, due to
race condition
2025-12-16 09:48:29 -08:00
iceweasel-oai
13c0919bff Elevated Sandbox 2 (#7792)
- DPAPI helpers for storing Sandbox user passwords securely
- creation of Offline/Online sandbox users
- ACL setup for sandbox users
- firewall rule setup
2025-12-10 21:23:16 -08:00