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## Problem Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`. The clearest report is in [#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this investigation comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751): on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`. The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict` profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`. Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise enabled and `uidmap` was installed. ## What this PR changes - prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available - keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing - when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!` - use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution path and the `/proc` preflight path - document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox and core READMEs ## Why this fix This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from [#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored helper. The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find `/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level sandbox stderr. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned` - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets` - `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets` - `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`
135 lines
4.5 KiB
Rust
135 lines
4.5 KiB
Rust
use std::ffi::CString;
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use std::fs::File;
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use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
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use std::os::raw::c_char;
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use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStrExt;
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use std::path::Path;
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use crate::vendored_bwrap::exec_vendored_bwrap;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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const SYSTEM_BWRAP_PATH: &str = "/usr/bin/bwrap";
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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enum BubblewrapLauncher {
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System(AbsolutePathBuf),
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Vendored,
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}
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pub(crate) fn exec_bwrap(argv: Vec<String>, preserved_files: Vec<File>) -> ! {
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match preferred_bwrap_launcher() {
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BubblewrapLauncher::System(program) => exec_system_bwrap(&program, argv, preserved_files),
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BubblewrapLauncher::Vendored => exec_vendored_bwrap(argv, preserved_files),
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}
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}
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fn preferred_bwrap_launcher() -> BubblewrapLauncher {
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if !Path::new(SYSTEM_BWRAP_PATH).is_file() {
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return BubblewrapLauncher::Vendored;
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}
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let system_bwrap_path = match AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(SYSTEM_BWRAP_PATH) {
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Ok(path) => path,
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Err(err) => panic!("failed to normalize system bubblewrap path {SYSTEM_BWRAP_PATH}: {err}"),
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};
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BubblewrapLauncher::System(system_bwrap_path)
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}
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fn exec_system_bwrap(
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program: &AbsolutePathBuf,
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argv: Vec<String>,
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preserved_files: Vec<File>,
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) -> ! {
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// System bwrap runs across an exec boundary, so preserved fds must survive exec.
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make_files_inheritable(&preserved_files);
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let program_path = program.as_path().display().to_string();
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let program = CString::new(program.as_path().as_os_str().as_bytes())
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.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("invalid system bubblewrap path: {err}"));
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let cstrings = argv_to_cstrings(&argv);
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let mut argv_ptrs: Vec<*const c_char> = cstrings.iter().map(|arg| arg.as_ptr()).collect();
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argv_ptrs.push(std::ptr::null());
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// SAFETY: `program` and every entry in `argv_ptrs` are valid C strings for
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// the duration of the call. On success `execv` does not return.
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unsafe {
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libc::execv(program.as_ptr(), argv_ptrs.as_ptr());
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}
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let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
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panic!("failed to exec system bubblewrap {program_path}: {err}");
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}
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fn argv_to_cstrings(argv: &[String]) -> Vec<CString> {
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let mut cstrings: Vec<CString> = Vec::with_capacity(argv.len());
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for arg in argv {
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match CString::new(arg.as_str()) {
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Ok(value) => cstrings.push(value),
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Err(err) => panic!("failed to convert argv to CString: {err}"),
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}
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}
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cstrings
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}
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fn make_files_inheritable(files: &[File]) {
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for file in files {
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clear_cloexec(file.as_raw_fd());
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}
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}
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fn clear_cloexec(fd: libc::c_int) {
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// SAFETY: `fd` is an owned descriptor kept alive by `files`.
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let flags = unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_GETFD) };
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if flags < 0 {
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let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
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panic!("failed to read fd flags for preserved bubblewrap file descriptor {fd}: {err}");
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}
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let cleared_flags = flags & !libc::FD_CLOEXEC;
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if cleared_flags == flags {
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return;
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}
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// SAFETY: `fd` is valid and we are only clearing FD_CLOEXEC.
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let result = unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_SETFD, cleared_flags) };
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if result < 0 {
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let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
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panic!("failed to clear CLOEXEC for preserved bubblewrap file descriptor {fd}: {err}");
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
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use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
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#[test]
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fn preserved_files_are_made_inheritable_for_system_exec() {
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let file = NamedTempFile::new().expect("temp file");
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set_cloexec(file.as_file().as_raw_fd());
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make_files_inheritable(std::slice::from_ref(file.as_file()));
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assert_eq!(fd_flags(file.as_file().as_raw_fd()) & libc::FD_CLOEXEC, 0);
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}
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fn set_cloexec(fd: libc::c_int) {
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let flags = fd_flags(fd);
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// SAFETY: `fd` is valid for the duration of the test.
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let result = unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_SETFD, flags | libc::FD_CLOEXEC) };
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if result < 0 {
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let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
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panic!("failed to set CLOEXEC for test fd {fd}: {err}");
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}
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}
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fn fd_flags(fd: libc::c_int) -> libc::c_int {
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// SAFETY: `fd` is valid for the duration of the test.
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let flags = unsafe { libc::fcntl(fd, libc::F_GETFD) };
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if flags < 0 {
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let err = std::io::Error::last_os_error();
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panic!("failed to read fd flags for test fd {fd}: {err}");
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}
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flags
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}
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}
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