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## Why Before this change, an escalation approval could say that a command should be rerun, but it could not carry the sandbox configuration that should still apply when the escalated command is actually spawned. That left an unsafe gap in the `zsh-fork` skill path: skill scripts under `scripts/` that did not declare permissions could be escalated without a sandbox, and scripts that did declare permissions could lose their bounded sandbox on rerun or cached session approval. This PR extends the escalation protocol so approvals can optionally carry sandbox configuration all the way through execution. That lets the shell runtime preserve the intended sandbox instead of silently widening access. We likely want a single permissions type for this codepath eventually, probably centered on `Permissions`. For now, the protocol needs to represent both the existing `PermissionProfile` form and the fuller `Permissions` form, so this introduces a temporary disjoint union, `EscalationPermissions`, to carry either one. Further, this means that today, a skill either: - does not declare any permissions, in which case it is run using the default sandbox for the turn - specifies permissions, in which case the skill is run using that exact sandbox, which might be more restrictive than the default sandbox for the turn We will likely change the skill's permissions to be additive to the existing permissions for the turn. ## What Changed - Added `EscalationPermissions` to `codex-protocol` so escalation requests can carry either a `PermissionProfile` or a full `Permissions` payload. - Added an explicit `EscalationExecution` mode to the shell escalation protocol so reruns distinguish between `Unsandboxed`, `TurnDefault`, and `Permissions(...)` instead of overloading `None`. - Updated `zsh-fork` shell reruns to resolve `TurnDefault` at execution time, which keeps ordinary `UseDefault` commands on the turn sandbox and preserves turn-level macOS seatbelt profile extensions. - Updated the `zsh-fork` skill path so a skill with no declared permissions inherits the conversation's effective sandbox instead of escalating unsandboxed. - Updated the `zsh-fork` skill path so a skill with declared permissions reruns with exactly those permissions, including when a cached session approval is reused. ## Testing - Added unit coverage in `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` for the explicit `UseDefault` / `RequireEscalated` / `WithAdditionalPermissions` execution mapping. - Added unit coverage in `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` for macOS seatbelt extension preservation in both the `TurnDefault` and explicit-permissions rerun paths. - Added integration coverage in `core/tests/suite/skill_approval.rs` for permissionless skills inheriting the turn sandbox and explicit skill permissions remaining bounded across cached approval reuse.
228 lines
8.4 KiB
Rust
228 lines
8.4 KiB
Rust
use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use crate::mcp::RequestId;
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use crate::models::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions;
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use crate::models::PermissionProfile;
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use crate::parse_command::ParsedCommand;
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use crate::protocol::FileChange;
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use crate::protocol::ReviewDecision;
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use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use schemars::JsonSchema;
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use serde::Serialize;
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use ts_rs::TS;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct Permissions {
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pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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pub macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Option<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>,
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}
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#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum EscalationPermissions {
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PermissionProfile(PermissionProfile),
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Permissions(Permissions),
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}
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/// Proposed execpolicy change to allow commands starting with this prefix.
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///
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/// The `command` tokens form the prefix that would be added as an execpolicy
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/// `prefix_rule(..., decision="allow")`, letting the agent bypass approval for
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/// commands that start with this token sequence.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
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#[serde(transparent)]
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#[ts(type = "Array<string>")]
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pub struct ExecPolicyAmendment {
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pub command: Vec<String>,
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}
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impl ExecPolicyAmendment {
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pub fn new(command: Vec<String>) -> Self {
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Self { command }
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}
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pub fn command(&self) -> &[String] {
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&self.command
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}
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}
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impl From<Vec<String>> for ExecPolicyAmendment {
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fn from(command: Vec<String>) -> Self {
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Self { command }
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}
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum NetworkApprovalProtocol {
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// TODO(viyatb): Add websocket protocol variants when managed proxy policy
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// decisions expose websocket traffic as a distinct approval context.
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Http,
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#[serde(alias = "https_connect", alias = "http-connect")]
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Https,
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Socks5Tcp,
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Socks5Udp,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
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pub struct NetworkApprovalContext {
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pub host: String,
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pub protocol: NetworkApprovalProtocol,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
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pub enum NetworkPolicyRuleAction {
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Allow,
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Deny,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
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pub struct NetworkPolicyAmendment {
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pub host: String,
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pub action: NetworkPolicyRuleAction,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
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pub struct ExecApprovalRequestEvent {
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/// Identifier for the associated command execution item.
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pub call_id: String,
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/// Identifier for this specific approval callback.
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///
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/// When absent, the approval is for the command item itself (`call_id`).
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/// This is present for subcommand approvals (via execve intercept).
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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#[ts(optional)]
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pub approval_id: Option<String>,
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/// Turn ID that this command belongs to.
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/// Uses `#[serde(default)]` for backwards compatibility.
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#[serde(default)]
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pub turn_id: String,
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/// The command to be executed.
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pub command: Vec<String>,
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/// The command's working directory.
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pub cwd: PathBuf,
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/// Optional human-readable reason for the approval (e.g. retry without sandbox).
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub reason: Option<String>,
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/// Optional network context for a blocked request that can be approved.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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#[ts(optional)]
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pub network_approval_context: Option<NetworkApprovalContext>,
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/// Proposed execpolicy amendment that can be applied to allow future runs.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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#[ts(optional)]
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pub proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Option<ExecPolicyAmendment>,
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/// Proposed network policy amendments (for example allow/deny this host in future).
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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#[ts(optional)]
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pub proposed_network_policy_amendments: Option<Vec<NetworkPolicyAmendment>>,
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/// Optional additional filesystem permissions requested for this command.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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#[ts(optional)]
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pub additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
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/// Ordered list of decisions the client may present for this prompt.
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///
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/// When absent, clients should derive the legacy default set from the
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/// other fields on this request.
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#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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#[ts(optional)]
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pub available_decisions: Option<Vec<ReviewDecision>>,
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pub parsed_cmd: Vec<ParsedCommand>,
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}
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impl ExecApprovalRequestEvent {
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pub fn effective_approval_id(&self) -> String {
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self.approval_id
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.clone()
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.unwrap_or_else(|| self.call_id.clone())
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}
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pub fn effective_available_decisions(&self) -> Vec<ReviewDecision> {
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// available_decisions is a new field that may not be populated by older
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// senders, so we fall back to the legacy logic if it's not present.
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match &self.available_decisions {
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Some(decisions) => decisions.clone(),
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None => Self::default_available_decisions(
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self.network_approval_context.as_ref(),
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self.proposed_execpolicy_amendment.as_ref(),
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self.proposed_network_policy_amendments.as_deref(),
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self.additional_permissions.as_ref(),
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),
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}
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}
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pub fn default_available_decisions(
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network_approval_context: Option<&NetworkApprovalContext>,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: Option<&ExecPolicyAmendment>,
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proposed_network_policy_amendments: Option<&[NetworkPolicyAmendment]>,
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additional_permissions: Option<&PermissionProfile>,
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) -> Vec<ReviewDecision> {
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if network_approval_context.is_some() {
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let mut decisions = vec![ReviewDecision::Approved, ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession];
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if let Some(amendment) = proposed_network_policy_amendments.and_then(|amendments| {
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amendments
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.iter()
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.find(|amendment| amendment.action == NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Allow)
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}) {
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decisions.push(ReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
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network_policy_amendment: amendment.clone(),
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});
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}
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decisions.push(ReviewDecision::Abort);
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return decisions;
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}
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if additional_permissions.is_some() {
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return vec![ReviewDecision::Approved, ReviewDecision::Abort];
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}
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let mut decisions = vec![ReviewDecision::Approved];
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if let Some(prefix) = proposed_execpolicy_amendment {
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decisions.push(ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: prefix.clone(),
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});
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}
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decisions.push(ReviewDecision::Abort);
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decisions
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}
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
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pub struct ElicitationRequestEvent {
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pub server_name: String,
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#[ts(type = "string | number")]
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pub id: RequestId,
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pub message: String,
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// TODO: MCP servers can request we fill out a schema for the elicitation. We don't support
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// this yet.
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// pub requested_schema: ElicitRequestParamsRequestedSchema,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
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pub enum ElicitationAction {
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Accept,
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Decline,
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Cancel,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
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pub struct ApplyPatchApprovalRequestEvent {
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/// Responses API call id for the associated patch apply call, if available.
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pub call_id: String,
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/// Turn ID that this patch belongs to.
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/// Uses `#[serde(default)]` for backwards compatibility with older senders.
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#[serde(default)]
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pub turn_id: String,
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pub changes: HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange>,
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/// Optional explanatory reason (e.g. request for extra write access).
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub reason: Option<String>,
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/// When set, the agent is asking the user to allow writes under this root for the remainder of the session.
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub grant_root: Option<PathBuf>,
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}
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