5ceff6588e
## Why `apply_patch` safety approval was still checking writable paths through the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection. That can hide explicit `none` carveouts when a split filesystem policy projects back to compatibility `ExternalSandbox`, which leaves one more approval path that can auto-approve writes inside paths that are intentionally blocked. ## What changed - passed `turn.file_system_sandbox_policy` into `assess_patch_safety` - changed writable-path checks to derive effective access from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` instead of the legacy `SandboxPolicy` - made those checks reject explicit unreadable roots before considering broad write access or writable roots - added regression coverage showing that an `ExternalSandbox` compatibility projection still asks for approval when the split filesystem policy blocks a subpath ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core safety::tests::` - `cargo test -p codex-core test_sandbox_config_parsing` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13445). * #13453 * #13452 * #13451 * #13449 * #13448 * __->__ #13445 * #13440 * #13439 --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.