Files
codex/codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs
iceweasel-oai d65fe38b2c use a junction for the cwd while read ACLs are being applied (#8444)
The elevated setup synchronously applies read/write ACLs to any
workspace roots.

However, until we apply *read* permission to the full path, powershell
cannot use some roots as a cwd as it needs access to all parts of the
path in order to apply it as the working directory for a command.

The solution is, while the async read-ACL part of setup is running, use
a "junction" that lives in C:\Users\CodexSandbox{Offline|Online} that
points to the cwd.

Once the read ACLs are applied, we stop using the junction.

-----

this PR also removes some dead code and overly-verbose logging, and has
some light refactoring to the ACL-related functions
2025-12-22 12:23:13 -08:00

527 lines
20 KiB
Rust

mod windows_impl {
use crate::acl::allow_null_device;
use crate::allow::compute_allow_paths;
use crate::allow::AllowDenyPaths;
use crate::cap::load_or_create_cap_sids;
use crate::env::ensure_non_interactive_pager;
use crate::env::inherit_path_env;
use crate::env::normalize_null_device_env;
use crate::identity::require_logon_sandbox_creds;
use crate::logging::log_failure;
use crate::logging::log_note;
use crate::logging::log_start;
use crate::logging::log_success;
use crate::policy::parse_policy;
use crate::policy::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::token::convert_string_sid_to_sid;
use crate::winutil::quote_windows_arg;
use crate::winutil::to_wide;
use anyhow::Result;
use rand::rngs::SmallRng;
use rand::Rng;
use rand::SeedableRng;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::ffi::c_void;
use std::fs;
use std::io;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::ptr;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::CloseHandle;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::GetLastError;
use windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::HANDLE;
use windows_sys::Win32::Security::Authorization::ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW;
use windows_sys::Win32::Security::PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR;
use windows_sys::Win32::Security::SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Diagnostics::Debug::SetErrorMode;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Pipes::ConnectNamedPipe;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Pipes::CreateNamedPipeW;
// PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX is 0x00000003; not exposed in windows-sys 0.52, so use the value directly.
const PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX: u32 = 0x0000_0003;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Pipes::PIPE_READMODE_BYTE;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Pipes::PIPE_TYPE_BYTE;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Pipes::PIPE_WAIT;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::CreateProcessWithLogonW;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::GetExitCodeProcess;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::WaitForSingleObject;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::INFINITE;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::LOGON_WITH_PROFILE;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::PROCESS_INFORMATION;
use windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::STARTUPINFOW;
/// Ensures the parent directory of a path exists before writing to it.
/// Walks upward from `start` to locate the git worktree root, following gitfile redirects.
fn find_git_root(start: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let mut cur = dunce::canonicalize(start).ok()?;
loop {
let marker = cur.join(".git");
if marker.is_dir() {
return Some(cur);
}
if marker.is_file() {
if let Ok(txt) = std::fs::read_to_string(&marker) {
if let Some(rest) = txt.trim().strip_prefix("gitdir:") {
let gitdir = rest.trim();
let resolved = if Path::new(gitdir).is_absolute() {
PathBuf::from(gitdir)
} else {
cur.join(gitdir)
};
return resolved.parent().map(|p| p.to_path_buf()).or(Some(cur));
}
}
return Some(cur);
}
let parent = cur.parent()?;
if parent == cur {
return None;
}
cur = parent.to_path_buf();
}
}
/// Creates the sandbox user's Codex home directory if it does not already exist.
fn ensure_codex_home_exists(p: &Path) -> Result<()> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(p)?;
Ok(())
}
/// Adds a git safe.directory entry to the environment when running inside a repository.
/// git will not otherwise allow the Sandbox user to run git commands on the repo directory
/// which is owned by the primary user.
fn inject_git_safe_directory(
env_map: &mut HashMap<String, String>,
cwd: &Path,
_logs_base_dir: Option<&Path>,
) {
if let Some(git_root) = find_git_root(cwd) {
let mut cfg_count: usize = env_map
.get("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT")
.and_then(|v| v.parse::<usize>().ok())
.unwrap_or(0);
let git_path = git_root.to_string_lossy().replace("\\\\", "/");
env_map.insert(
format!("GIT_CONFIG_KEY_{cfg_count}"),
"safe.directory".to_string(),
);
env_map.insert(format!("GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_{cfg_count}"), git_path);
cfg_count += 1;
env_map.insert("GIT_CONFIG_COUNT".to_string(), cfg_count.to_string());
}
}
/// Locates `codex-command-runner.exe` next to the current binary.
fn find_runner_exe() -> PathBuf {
if let Ok(exe) = std::env::current_exe() {
if let Some(dir) = exe.parent() {
let candidate = dir.join("codex-command-runner.exe");
if candidate.exists() {
return candidate;
}
}
}
PathBuf::from("codex-command-runner.exe")
}
/// Generates a unique named-pipe path used to communicate with the runner process.
fn pipe_name(suffix: &str) -> String {
let mut rng = SmallRng::from_entropy();
format!(r"\\.\pipe\codex-runner-{:x}-{}", rng.gen::<u128>(), suffix)
}
/// Creates a named pipe with permissive ACLs so the sandbox user can connect.
fn create_named_pipe(name: &str, access: u32) -> io::Result<HANDLE> {
// Allow sandbox users to connect by granting Everyone full access on the pipe.
let sddl = to_wide("D:(A;;GA;;;WD)");
let mut sd: PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR = ptr::null_mut();
let ok = unsafe {
ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
sddl.as_ptr(),
1, // SDDL_REVISION_1
&mut sd,
ptr::null_mut(),
)
};
if ok == 0 {
return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(unsafe {
GetLastError() as i32
}));
}
let mut sa = SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES {
nLength: std::mem::size_of::<SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES>() as u32,
lpSecurityDescriptor: sd,
bInheritHandle: 0,
};
let wide = to_wide(name);
let h = unsafe {
CreateNamedPipeW(
wide.as_ptr(),
access,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE | PIPE_WAIT,
1,
65536,
65536,
0,
&mut sa as *mut SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES,
)
};
if h == 0 || h == windows_sys::Win32::Foundation::INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE {
return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(unsafe {
GetLastError() as i32
}));
}
Ok(h)
}
/// Waits for a client connection on the named pipe, tolerating an existing connection.
fn connect_pipe(h: HANDLE) -> io::Result<()> {
let ok = unsafe { ConnectNamedPipe(h, ptr::null_mut()) };
if ok == 0 {
let err = unsafe { GetLastError() };
const ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED: u32 = 535;
if err != ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED {
return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(err as i32));
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub use crate::windows_impl::CaptureResult;
#[derive(serde::Serialize)]
struct RunnerPayload {
policy_json_or_preset: String,
sandbox_policy_cwd: PathBuf,
// Writable log dir for sandbox user (.codex in sandbox profile).
codex_home: PathBuf,
// Real user's CODEX_HOME for shared data (caps, config).
real_codex_home: PathBuf,
cap_sid: String,
request_file: Option<PathBuf>,
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,
env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
stdin_pipe: String,
stdout_pipe: String,
stderr_pipe: String,
}
/// Launches the command runner under the sandbox user and captures its output.
pub fn run_windows_sandbox_capture(
policy_json_or_preset: &str,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
codex_home: &Path,
command: Vec<String>,
cwd: &Path,
mut env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<CaptureResult> {
let policy = parse_policy(policy_json_or_preset)?;
normalize_null_device_env(&mut env_map);
ensure_non_interactive_pager(&mut env_map);
inherit_path_env(&mut env_map);
inject_git_safe_directory(&mut env_map, cwd, None);
let current_dir = cwd.to_path_buf();
// Use a temp-based log dir that the sandbox user can write.
let sandbox_base = codex_home.join(".sandbox");
ensure_codex_home_exists(&sandbox_base)?;
let logs_base_dir: Option<&Path> = Some(sandbox_base.as_path());
log_start(&command, logs_base_dir);
let sandbox_creds =
require_logon_sandbox_creds(&policy, sandbox_policy_cwd, cwd, &env_map, codex_home)?;
// Build capability SID for ACL grants.
if matches!(
&policy,
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. }
) {
anyhow::bail!("DangerFullAccess and ExternalSandbox are not supported for sandboxing")
}
let caps = load_or_create_cap_sids(codex_home)?;
let (psid_to_use, cap_sid_str) = match &policy {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly => (
unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.readonly).unwrap() },
caps.readonly.clone(),
),
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => (
unsafe { convert_string_sid_to_sid(&caps.workspace).unwrap() },
caps.workspace.clone(),
),
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
unreachable!("DangerFullAccess handled above")
}
};
let AllowDenyPaths { allow: _, deny: _ } =
compute_allow_paths(&policy, sandbox_policy_cwd, &current_dir, &env_map);
// Deny/allow ACEs are now applied during setup; avoid per-command churn.
unsafe {
allow_null_device(psid_to_use);
}
// Prepare named pipes for runner.
let stdin_name = pipe_name("stdin");
let stdout_name = pipe_name("stdout");
let stderr_name = pipe_name("stderr");
let h_stdin_pipe = create_named_pipe(
&stdin_name,
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE | PIPE_WAIT,
)?;
let h_stdout_pipe = create_named_pipe(
&stdout_name,
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE | PIPE_WAIT,
)?;
let h_stderr_pipe = create_named_pipe(
&stderr_name,
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE | PIPE_WAIT,
)?;
// Launch runner as sandbox user via CreateProcessWithLogonW.
let runner_exe = find_runner_exe();
let runner_cmdline = runner_exe
.to_str()
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "codex-command-runner.exe".to_string());
// Write request to a file under the sandbox base dir for the runner to read.
// TODO(iceweasel) - use a different mechanism for invoking the runner.
let base_tmp = sandbox_base.join("requests");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&base_tmp)?;
let mut rng = SmallRng::from_entropy();
let req_file = base_tmp.join(format!("request-{:x}.json", rng.gen::<u128>()));
let payload = RunnerPayload {
policy_json_or_preset: policy_json_or_preset.to_string(),
sandbox_policy_cwd: sandbox_policy_cwd.to_path_buf(),
codex_home: sandbox_base.clone(),
real_codex_home: codex_home.to_path_buf(),
cap_sid: cap_sid_str.clone(),
request_file: Some(req_file.clone()),
command: command.clone(),
cwd: cwd.to_path_buf(),
env_map: env_map.clone(),
timeout_ms,
stdin_pipe: stdin_name.clone(),
stdout_pipe: stdout_name.clone(),
stderr_pipe: stderr_name.clone(),
};
let payload_json = serde_json::to_string(&payload)?;
if let Err(e) = fs::write(&req_file, &payload_json) {
log_note(
&format!("error writing request file {}: {}", req_file.display(), e),
logs_base_dir,
);
return Err(e.into());
}
let runner_full_cmd = format!(
"{} {}",
quote_windows_arg(&runner_cmdline),
quote_windows_arg(&format!("--request-file={}", req_file.display()))
);
let mut cmdline_vec: Vec<u16> = to_wide(&runner_full_cmd);
let exe_w: Vec<u16> = to_wide(&runner_cmdline);
let cwd_w: Vec<u16> = to_wide(cwd);
// Minimal CPWL launch: inherit env, no desktop override, no handle inheritance.
let env_block: Option<Vec<u16>> = None;
let mut si: STARTUPINFOW = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
si.cb = std::mem::size_of::<STARTUPINFOW>() as u32;
let mut pi: PROCESS_INFORMATION = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
let user_w = to_wide(&sandbox_creds.username);
let domain_w = to_wide(".");
let password_w = to_wide(&sandbox_creds.password);
// Suppress WER/UI popups from the runner process so we can collect exit codes.
let _ = unsafe { SetErrorMode(0x0001 | 0x0002) }; // SEM_FAILCRITICALERRORS | SEM_NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
// Ensure command line buffer is mutable and includes the exe as argv[0].
let spawn_res = unsafe {
CreateProcessWithLogonW(
user_w.as_ptr(),
domain_w.as_ptr(),
password_w.as_ptr(),
LOGON_WITH_PROFILE,
exe_w.as_ptr(),
cmdline_vec.as_mut_ptr(),
windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::CREATE_NO_WINDOW
| windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT,
env_block
.as_ref()
.map(|b| b.as_ptr() as *const c_void)
.unwrap_or(ptr::null()),
cwd_w.as_ptr(),
&si,
&mut pi,
)
};
if spawn_res == 0 {
let err = unsafe { GetLastError() } as i32;
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("CreateProcessWithLogonW failed: {}", err));
}
// Pipes are no longer passed as std handles; no stdin payload is sent.
connect_pipe(h_stdin_pipe)?;
connect_pipe(h_stdout_pipe)?;
connect_pipe(h_stderr_pipe)?;
unsafe {
CloseHandle(h_stdin_pipe);
}
// Read stdout/stderr.
let (tx_out, rx_out) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<Vec<u8>>();
let (tx_err, rx_err) = std::sync::mpsc::channel::<Vec<u8>>();
let t_out = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
loop {
let mut read_bytes: u32 = 0;
let ok = unsafe {
windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::ReadFile(
h_stdout_pipe,
tmp.as_mut_ptr(),
tmp.len() as u32,
&mut read_bytes,
std::ptr::null_mut(),
)
};
if ok == 0 || read_bytes == 0 {
break;
}
buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..read_bytes as usize]);
}
let _ = tx_out.send(buf);
});
let t_err = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
loop {
let mut read_bytes: u32 = 0;
let ok = unsafe {
windows_sys::Win32::Storage::FileSystem::ReadFile(
h_stderr_pipe,
tmp.as_mut_ptr(),
tmp.len() as u32,
&mut read_bytes,
std::ptr::null_mut(),
)
};
if ok == 0 || read_bytes == 0 {
break;
}
buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..read_bytes as usize]);
}
let _ = tx_err.send(buf);
});
let timeout = timeout_ms.map(|ms| ms as u32).unwrap_or(INFINITE);
let res = unsafe { WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, timeout) };
let timed_out = res == 0x0000_0102;
let mut exit_code_u32: u32 = 1;
if !timed_out {
unsafe {
GetExitCodeProcess(pi.hProcess, &mut exit_code_u32);
}
} else {
unsafe {
windows_sys::Win32::System::Threading::TerminateProcess(pi.hProcess, 1);
}
}
unsafe {
if pi.hThread != 0 {
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
}
if pi.hProcess != 0 {
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
}
CloseHandle(h_stdout_pipe);
CloseHandle(h_stderr_pipe);
}
let _ = t_out.join();
let _ = t_err.join();
let stdout = rx_out.recv().unwrap_or_default();
let stderr = rx_err.recv().unwrap_or_default();
let exit_code = if timed_out {
128 + 64
} else {
exit_code_u32 as i32
};
if exit_code == 0 {
log_success(&command, logs_base_dir);
} else {
log_failure(&command, &format!("exit code {}", exit_code), logs_base_dir);
}
Ok(CaptureResult {
exit_code,
stdout,
stderr,
timed_out,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::policy::SandboxPolicy;
fn workspace_policy(network_access: bool) -> SandboxPolicy {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
}
}
#[test]
fn applies_network_block_when_access_is_disabled() {
assert!(!workspace_policy(false).has_full_network_access());
}
#[test]
fn skips_network_block_when_access_is_allowed() {
assert!(workspace_policy(true).has_full_network_access());
}
#[test]
fn applies_network_block_for_read_only() {
assert!(!SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly.has_full_network_access());
}
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub use windows_impl::run_windows_sandbox_capture;
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
mod stub {
use anyhow::bail;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::Path;
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct CaptureResult {
pub exit_code: i32,
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
pub timed_out: bool,
}
/// Stub implementation for non-Windows targets; sandboxing only works on Windows.
pub fn run_windows_sandbox_capture(
_policy_json_or_preset: &str,
_sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
_codex_home: &Path,
_command: Vec<String>,
_cwd: &Path,
_env_map: HashMap<String, String>,
_timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
) -> Result<CaptureResult> {
bail!("Windows sandbox is only available on Windows")
}
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
pub use stub::run_windows_sandbox_capture;