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## Problem Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`. The clearest report is in [#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this investigation comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751): on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`. The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict` profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`. Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise enabled and `uidmap` was installed. ## What this PR changes - prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available - keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing - when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!` - use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution path and the `/proc` preflight path - document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox and core READMEs ## Why this fix This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from [#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored helper. The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find `/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level sandbox stderr. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned` - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets` - `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets` - `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`
79 lines
2.8 KiB
Rust
79 lines
2.8 KiB
Rust
//! Build-time bubblewrap entrypoint.
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//!
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//! On Linux targets, the build script compiles bubblewrap's C sources and
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//! exposes a `bwrap_main` symbol that we can call via FFI.
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#[cfg(vendored_bwrap_available)]
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mod imp {
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use std::ffi::CString;
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use std::fs::File;
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use std::os::raw::c_char;
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unsafe extern "C" {
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fn bwrap_main(argc: libc::c_int, argv: *const *const c_char) -> libc::c_int;
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}
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fn argv_to_cstrings(argv: &[String]) -> Vec<CString> {
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let mut cstrings: Vec<CString> = Vec::with_capacity(argv.len());
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for arg in argv {
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match CString::new(arg.as_str()) {
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Ok(value) => cstrings.push(value),
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Err(err) => panic!("failed to convert argv to CString: {err}"),
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}
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}
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cstrings
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}
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/// Run the build-time bubblewrap `main` function and return its exit code.
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///
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/// On success, bubblewrap will `execve` into the target program and this
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/// function will never return. A return value therefore implies failure.
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pub(crate) fn run_vendored_bwrap_main(
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argv: &[String],
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_preserved_files: &[File],
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) -> libc::c_int {
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let cstrings = argv_to_cstrings(argv);
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let mut argv_ptrs: Vec<*const c_char> = cstrings.iter().map(|arg| arg.as_ptr()).collect();
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argv_ptrs.push(std::ptr::null());
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// SAFETY: We provide a null-terminated argv vector whose pointers
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// remain valid for the duration of the call.
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unsafe { bwrap_main(cstrings.len() as libc::c_int, argv_ptrs.as_ptr()) }
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}
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/// Execute the build-time bubblewrap `main` function with the given argv.
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pub(crate) fn exec_vendored_bwrap(argv: Vec<String>, preserved_files: Vec<File>) -> ! {
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let exit_code = run_vendored_bwrap_main(&argv, &preserved_files);
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std::process::exit(exit_code);
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}
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}
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#[cfg(not(vendored_bwrap_available))]
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mod imp {
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use std::fs::File;
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/// Panics with a clear error when the build-time bwrap path is not enabled.
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pub(crate) fn run_vendored_bwrap_main(
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_argv: &[String],
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_preserved_files: &[File],
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) -> libc::c_int {
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panic!(
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r#"build-time bubblewrap is not available in this build.
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codex-linux-sandbox should always compile vendored bubblewrap on Linux targets.
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Notes:
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- ensure the target OS is Linux
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- libcap headers must be available via pkg-config
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- bubblewrap sources expected at codex-rs/vendor/bubblewrap (default)"#
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);
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}
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/// Panics with a clear error when the build-time bwrap path is not enabled.
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pub(crate) fn exec_vendored_bwrap(_argv: Vec<String>, _preserved_files: Vec<File>) -> ! {
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let _ = run_vendored_bwrap_main(&[], &[]);
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unreachable!("run_vendored_bwrap_main should always panic in this configuration")
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}
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}
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pub(crate) use imp::exec_vendored_bwrap;
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