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## Summary This PR introduces a gated Bubblewrap (bwrap) Linux sandbox path. The curent Linux sandbox path relies on in-process restrictions (including Landlock). Bubblewrap gives us a more uniform filesystem isolation model, especially explicit writable roots with the option to make some directories read-only and granular network controls. This is behind a feature flag so we can validate behavior safely before making it the default. - Added temporary rollout flag: - `features.use_linux_sandbox_bwrap` - Preserved existing default path when the flag is off. - In Bubblewrap mode: - Added internal retry without /proc when /proc mount is not permitted by the host/container.
253 lines
8.5 KiB
Rust
253 lines
8.5 KiB
Rust
//! Bubblewrap-based filesystem sandboxing for Linux.
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//!
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//! This module mirrors the semantics used by the macOS Seatbelt sandbox:
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//! - the filesystem is read-only by default,
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//! - explicit writable roots are layered on top, and
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//! - sensitive subpaths such as `.git` and `.codex` remain read-only even when
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//! their parent root is writable.
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//!
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//! The overall Linux sandbox is composed of:
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//! - seccomp + `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` applied in-process, and
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//! - bubblewrap used to construct the filesystem view before exec.
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use std::collections::BTreeSet;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use codex_core::error::CodexErr;
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use codex_core::error::Result;
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use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use codex_core::protocol::WritableRoot;
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/// Options that control how bubblewrap is invoked.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) struct BwrapOptions {
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/// Whether to mount a fresh `/proc` inside the PID namespace.
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///
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/// This is the secure default, but some restrictive container environments
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/// deny `--proc /proc` even when PID namespaces are available.
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pub mount_proc: bool,
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}
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impl Default for BwrapOptions {
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fn default() -> Self {
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Self { mount_proc: true }
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}
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}
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/// Wrap a command with bubblewrap so the filesystem is read-only by default,
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/// with explicit writable roots and read-only subpaths layered afterward.
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///
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/// When the policy grants full disk write access, this returns `command`
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/// unchanged so we avoid unnecessary sandboxing overhead.
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pub(crate) fn create_bwrap_command_args(
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command: Vec<String>,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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cwd: &Path,
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options: BwrapOptions,
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) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
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if sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
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return Ok(command);
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}
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create_bwrap_flags(command, sandbox_policy, cwd, options)
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}
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/// Build the bubblewrap flags (everything after `argv[0]`).
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fn create_bwrap_flags(
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command: Vec<String>,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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cwd: &Path,
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options: BwrapOptions,
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) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
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let mut args = Vec::new();
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args.push("--new-session".to_string());
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args.push("--die-with-parent".to_string());
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args.extend(create_filesystem_args(sandbox_policy, cwd)?);
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// Isolate the PID namespace.
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args.push("--unshare-pid".to_string());
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// Mount a fresh /proc unless the caller explicitly disables it.
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if options.mount_proc {
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args.push("--proc".to_string());
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args.push("/proc".to_string());
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}
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args.push("--".to_string());
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args.extend(command);
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Ok(args)
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}
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/// Build the bubblewrap filesystem mounts for a given sandbox policy.
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///
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/// The mount order is important:
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/// 1. `--ro-bind / /` makes the entire filesystem read-only.
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/// 2. `--bind <root> <root>` re-enables writes for allowed roots.
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/// 3. `--ro-bind <subpath> <subpath>` re-applies read-only protections under
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/// those writable roots so protected subpaths win.
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/// 4. `--dev-bind /dev/null /dev/null` preserves the common sink even under a
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/// read-only root.
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fn create_filesystem_args(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
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let writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd);
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ensure_mount_targets_exist(&writable_roots)?;
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let mut args = Vec::new();
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// Read-only root, then selectively re-enable writes.
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args.push("--ro-bind".to_string());
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args.push("/".to_string());
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args.push("/".to_string());
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for writable_root in &writable_roots {
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let root = writable_root.root.as_path();
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args.push("--bind".to_string());
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args.push(path_to_string(root));
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args.push(path_to_string(root));
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}
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// Re-apply read-only subpaths after the writable binds so they win.
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let allowed_write_paths: Vec<PathBuf> = writable_roots
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.iter()
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.map(|writable_root| writable_root.root.as_path().to_path_buf())
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.collect();
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for subpath in collect_read_only_subpaths(&writable_roots) {
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if let Some(symlink_path) = find_symlink_in_path(&subpath, &allowed_write_paths) {
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args.push("--ro-bind".to_string());
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args.push("/dev/null".to_string());
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args.push(path_to_string(&symlink_path));
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continue;
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}
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if !subpath.exists() {
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if let Some(first_missing) = find_first_non_existent_component(&subpath)
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&& is_within_allowed_write_paths(&first_missing, &allowed_write_paths)
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{
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args.push("--ro-bind".to_string());
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args.push("/dev/null".to_string());
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args.push(path_to_string(&first_missing));
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}
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continue;
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}
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if is_within_allowed_write_paths(&subpath, &allowed_write_paths) {
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args.push("--ro-bind".to_string());
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args.push(path_to_string(&subpath));
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args.push(path_to_string(&subpath));
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}
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}
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// Ensure `/dev/null` remains usable regardless of the root bind.
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args.push("--dev-bind".to_string());
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args.push("/dev/null".to_string());
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args.push("/dev/null".to_string());
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Ok(args)
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}
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/// Collect unique read-only subpaths across all writable roots.
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fn collect_read_only_subpaths(writable_roots: &[WritableRoot]) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
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let mut subpaths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = BTreeSet::new();
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for writable_root in writable_roots {
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for subpath in &writable_root.read_only_subpaths {
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subpaths.insert(subpath.as_path().to_path_buf());
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}
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}
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subpaths.into_iter().collect()
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}
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/// Validate that writable roots exist before constructing mounts.
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///
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/// Bubblewrap requires bind mount targets to exist. We fail fast with a clear
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/// error so callers can present an actionable message.
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fn ensure_mount_targets_exist(writable_roots: &[WritableRoot]) -> Result<()> {
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for writable_root in writable_roots {
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let root = writable_root.root.as_path();
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if !root.exists() {
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return Err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(format!(
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"Sandbox expected writable root {root}, but it does not exist.",
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root = root.display()
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)));
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn path_to_string(path: &Path) -> String {
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path.to_string_lossy().to_string()
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}
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/// Returns true when `path` is under any allowed writable root.
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fn is_within_allowed_write_paths(path: &Path, allowed_write_paths: &[PathBuf]) -> bool {
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allowed_write_paths
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.iter()
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.any(|root| path.starts_with(root))
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}
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/// Find the first symlink along `target_path` that is also under a writable root.
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///
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/// This blocks symlink replacement attacks where a protected path is a symlink
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/// inside a writable root (e.g., `.codex -> ./decoy`). In that case we mount
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/// `/dev/null` on the symlink itself to prevent rewiring it.
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fn find_symlink_in_path(target_path: &Path, allowed_write_paths: &[PathBuf]) -> Option<PathBuf> {
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let mut current = PathBuf::new();
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for component in target_path.components() {
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use std::path::Component;
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match component {
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Component::RootDir => {
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current.push(Path::new("/"));
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continue;
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}
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Component::CurDir => continue,
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Component::ParentDir => {
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current.pop();
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continue;
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}
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Component::Normal(part) => current.push(part),
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Component::Prefix(_) => continue,
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}
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let metadata = match std::fs::symlink_metadata(¤t) {
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Ok(metadata) => metadata,
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Err(_) => break,
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};
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if metadata.file_type().is_symlink()
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&& is_within_allowed_write_paths(¤t, allowed_write_paths)
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{
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return Some(current);
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}
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}
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None
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}
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/// Find the first missing path component while walking `target_path`.
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///
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/// Mounting `/dev/null` on the first missing component prevents the sandboxed
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/// process from creating the protected path hierarchy.
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fn find_first_non_existent_component(target_path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
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let mut current = PathBuf::new();
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for component in target_path.components() {
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use std::path::Component;
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match component {
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Component::RootDir => {
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current.push(Path::new("/"));
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continue;
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}
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Component::CurDir => continue,
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Component::ParentDir => {
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current.pop();
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continue;
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}
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Component::Normal(part) => current.push(part),
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Component::Prefix(_) => continue,
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}
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if !current.exists() {
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return Some(current);
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}
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}
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None
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}
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