mirror of
https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-04-28 10:21:06 +03:00
## Why Bazel clippy now catches lints that `cargo clippy` can still miss when a crate under `codex-rs` forgets to opt into workspace lints. The concrete example here was `codex-rs/app-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml`: Bazel flagged a clippy violation in `models_cache.rs`, but Cargo did not because that crate inherited workspace package metadata without declaring `[lints] workspace = true`. We already mirror the workspace clippy deny list into Bazel after [#15955](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15955), so we also need a repo-side check that keeps every `codex-rs` manifest opted into the same workspace settings. ## What changed - add `.github/scripts/verify_cargo_workspace_manifests.py`, which parses every `codex-rs/**/Cargo.toml` with `tomllib` and verifies: - `version.workspace = true` - `edition.workspace = true` - `license.workspace = true` - `[lints] workspace = true` - top-level crate names follow the `codex-*` / `codex-utils-*` conventions, with explicit exceptions for `windows-sandbox-rs` and `utils/path-utils` - run that script in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` - update the current outlier manifests so the check is enforceable immediately - fix the newly exposed clippy violations in the affected crates (`app-server/tests/common`, `file-search`, `feedback`, `shell-escalation`, and `debug-client`) --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16353). * #16351 * __->__ #16353
codex-shell-escalation
This crate contains the Unix shell-escalation protocol implementation and the
codex-execve-wrapper executable.
codex-execve-wrapper receives the arguments to an intercepted execve(2) call and delegates the
decision to the shell-escalation protocol over a shared file descriptor (specified by the
CODEX_ESCALATE_SOCKET environment variable). The server on the other side replies with one of:
Run:codex-execve-wrappershould invokeexecve(2)on itself to run the original command within the sandboxed shell.Escalate: forward the file descriptors of the current process so the command can be run faithfully outside the sandbox. When the process completes, the server forwards the exit code back tocodex-execve-wrapper.Deny: the server has declared the proposed command to be forbidden, socodex-execve-wrapperprints an error tostderrand exits with1.
Patched zsh
We carry a small patch to Src/exec.c (see patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch) that adds support for EXEC_WRAPPER. The patch applies to 77045ef899e53b9598bebc5a41db93a548a40ca6 from https://git.code.sf.net/p/zsh/code. To rebuild manually:
git clone https://git.code.sf.net/p/zsh/code
git checkout 77045ef899e53b9598bebc5a41db93a548a40ca6
git apply /path/to/patches/zsh-exec-wrapper.patch
./Util/preconfig
./configure
make -j"$(nproc)"