d09a7535ed
## Why `PermissionProfile` should describe filesystem roots as absolute paths at the type level. Using `PathBuf` in `FileSystemPermissions` made the shared type too permissive and blurred together three different deserialization cases: - skill metadata in `agents/openai.yaml`, where relative paths should resolve against the skill directory - app-server API payloads, where callers should have to send absolute paths - local tool-call payloads for commands like `shell_command` and `exec_command`, where `additional_permissions.file_system` may legitimately be relative to the command `workdir` This change tightens the shared model without regressing the existing local command flow. ## What Changed - changed `protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions` and the app-server `AdditionalFileSystemPermissions` mirror to use `AbsolutePathBuf` - wrapped skill metadata deserialization in `AbsolutePathBufGuard`, so relative permission roots in `agents/openai.yaml` resolve against the containing skill directory - kept app-server/API deserialization strict, so relative `additionalPermissions.fileSystem.*` paths are rejected at the boundary - restored cwd/workdir-relative deserialization for local tool-call payloads by parsing `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command` arguments under an `AbsolutePathBufGuard` rooted at the resolved command working directory - simplified runtime additional-permission normalization so it only canonicalizes and deduplicates absolute roots instead of trying to recover relative ones later - updated the app-server schema fixtures, `app-server/README.md`, and the affected transport/TUI tests to match the final behavior
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.