## Summary - remove the remaining model-visible guardian-specific `on-request` prompt additions so enabling the feature does not change the main approval-policy instructions - neutralize user-facing guardian wording to talk about automatic approval review / approval requests rather than a second reviewer or only sandbox escalations - tighten guardian retry-context handling so agent-authored `justification` stays in the structured action JSON and is not also injected as raw retry context - simplify guardian review plumbing in core by deleting dead prompt-append paths and trimming some request/transcript setup code ## Notable Changes - delete the dead `permissions/approval_policy/guardian.md` append path and stop threading `guardian_approval_enabled` through model-facing developer-instruction builders - rename the experimental feature copy to `Automatic approval review` and update the `/experimental` snapshot text accordingly - make approval-review status strings generic across shell, patch, network, and MCP review types - forward real sandbox/network retry reasons for shell and unified-exec guardian review, but do not pass agent-authored justification as raw retry context - simplify `guardian.rs` by removing the one-field request wrapper, deduping reasoning-effort selection, and cleaning up transcript entry collection ## Testing - `just fmt` - full validation left to CI --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.