execpolicy2 core integration

fix PR

undo keyring store

codex-rs/Cargo.lock

@@ -1085,6 +1085,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "codex-apply-patch",
  "codex-arg0",
  "codex-async-utils",
+ "codex-execpolicy2",
  "codex-file-search",
  "codex-git",
  "codex-keyring-store",

codex-rs/Cargo.toml

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ members = [
 resolver = "2"
 
 [workspace.package]
-version = "0.59.0-alpha.7"
+version = "0.0.0"
 # Track the edition for all workspace crates in one place. Individual
 # crates can still override this value, but keeping it here means new
 # crates created with `cargo new -w ...` automatically inherit the 2024
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ codex-chatgpt = { path = "chatgpt" }
 codex-common = { path = "common" }
 codex-core = { path = "core" }
 codex-exec = { path = "exec" }
+codex-execpolicy2 = { path = "execpolicy2" }
 codex-feedback = { path = "feedback" }
 codex-file-search = { path = "file-search" }
 codex-git = { path = "utils/git" }

codex-rs/core/Cargo.toml

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ chrono = { workspace = true, features = ["serde"] }
 codex-app-server-protocol = { workspace = true }
 codex-apply-patch = { workspace = true }
 codex-async-utils = { workspace = true }
+codex-execpolicy2 = { workspace = true }
 codex-file-search = { workspace = true }
 codex-git = { workspace = true }
 codex-keyring-store = { workspace = true }

codex-rs/core/src/codex.rs

@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ use crate::user_instructions::UserInstructions;
 use crate::user_notification::UserNotification;
 use crate::util::backoff;
 use codex_async_utils::OrCancelExt;
+use codex_execpolicy2::Policy as ExecPolicyV2;
 use codex_otel::otel_event_manager::OtelEventManager;
 use codex_protocol::config_types::ReasoningEffort as ReasoningEffortConfig;
 use codex_protocol::config_types::ReasoningSummary as ReasoningSummaryConfig;
@@ -165,6 +166,10 @@ impl Codex {
 
         let user_instructions = get_user_instructions(&config).await;
 
+        let exec_policy_v2 =
+            crate::exec_policy::exec_policy_for(&config.features, &config.codex_home)
+                .map_err(|err| CodexErr::Fatal(format!("failed to load execpolicy2: {err}")))?;
+
         let config = Arc::new(config);
 
         let session_configuration = SessionConfiguration {
@@ -181,6 +186,7 @@ impl Codex {
             cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
             original_config_do_not_use: Arc::clone(&config),
             features: config.features.clone(),
+            exec_policy_v2,
             session_source,
         };
 
@@ -278,6 +284,7 @@ pub(crate) struct TurnContext {
     pub(crate) final_output_json_schema: Option<Value>,
     pub(crate) codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf>,
     pub(crate) tool_call_gate: Arc<ReadinessFlag>,
+    pub(crate) exec_policy_v2: Option<Arc<ExecPolicyV2>>,
 }
 
 impl TurnContext {
@@ -334,6 +341,8 @@ pub(crate) struct SessionConfiguration {
 
     /// Set of feature flags for this session
     features: Features,
+    /// Optional execpolicy2 policy, applied only when enabled by feature flag.
+    exec_policy_v2: Option<Arc<ExecPolicyV2>>,
 
     // TODO(pakrym): Remove config from here
     original_config_do_not_use: Arc<Config>,
@@ -434,6 +443,7 @@ impl Session {
             final_output_json_schema: None,
             codex_linux_sandbox_exe: config.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone(),
             tool_call_gate: Arc::new(ReadinessFlag::new()),
+            exec_policy_v2: session_configuration.exec_policy_v2.clone(),
         }
     }
 
@@ -1758,6 +1768,7 @@ async fn spawn_review_thread(
         final_output_json_schema: None,
         codex_linux_sandbox_exe: parent_turn_context.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone(),
         tool_call_gate: Arc::new(ReadinessFlag::new()),
+        exec_policy_v2: parent_turn_context.exec_policy_v2.clone(),
     };
 
     // Seed the child task with the review prompt as the initial user message.
@@ -2546,6 +2557,7 @@ mod tests {
             cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
             original_config_do_not_use: Arc::clone(&config),
             features: Features::default(),
+            exec_policy_v2: None,
             session_source: SessionSource::Exec,
         };
 
@@ -2623,6 +2635,7 @@ mod tests {
             cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
             original_config_do_not_use: Arc::clone(&config),
             features: Features::default(),
+            exec_policy_v2: None,
             session_source: SessionSource::Exec,
         };
 

codex-rs/core/src/exec_policy.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+use std::fs;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use crate::command_safety::is_dangerous_command::requires_initial_appoval;
+use codex_execpolicy2::Decision;
+use codex_execpolicy2::Evaluation;
+use codex_execpolicy2::Policy;
+use codex_execpolicy2::PolicyParser;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
+use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+use thiserror::Error;
+
+use crate::bash::parse_shell_lc_plain_commands;
+use crate::features::Feature;
+use crate::features::Features;
+use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalRequirement;
+
+const FORBIDDEN_REASON: &str = "execpolicy forbids this command";
+const PROMPT_REASON: &str = "execpolicy requires approval for this command";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Error)]
+pub enum ExecPolicyError {
+    #[error("failed to read execpolicy files from {dir}: {source}")]
+    ReadDir {
+        dir: PathBuf,
+        source: std::io::Error,
+    },
+
+    #[error("failed to read execpolicy file {path}: {source}")]
+    ReadFile {
+        path: PathBuf,
+        source: std::io::Error,
+    },
+
+    #[error("failed to parse execpolicy file {path}: {source}")]
+    ParsePolicy {
+        path: String,
+        source: codex_execpolicy2::Error,
+    },
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn exec_policy_for(
+    features: &Features,
+    codex_home: &Path,
+) -> Result<Option<Arc<Policy>>, ExecPolicyError> {
+    if !features.enabled(Feature::ExecPolicyV2) {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+
+    let policy_dir = codex_home.to_path_buf();
+    let entries = match fs::read_dir(&policy_dir) {
+        Ok(entries) => entries,
+        Err(source) if source.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
+        Err(source) => {
+            return Err(ExecPolicyError::ReadDir {
+                dir: policy_dir,
+                source,
+            });
+        }
+    };
+
+    let mut policy_paths: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
+    for entry in entries {
+        let entry = entry.map_err(|source| ExecPolicyError::ReadDir {
+            dir: policy_dir.clone(),
+            source,
+        })?;
+        let path = entry.path();
+        if path
+            .extension()
+            .and_then(|ext| ext.to_str())
+            .is_some_and(|ext| ext == "codexpolicy")
+            && path.is_file()
+        {
+            policy_paths.push(path);
+        }
+    }
+
+    policy_paths.sort();
+
+    let mut parser = PolicyParser::new();
+    for policy_path in &policy_paths {
+        let contents =
+            fs::read_to_string(policy_path).map_err(|source| ExecPolicyError::ReadFile {
+                path: policy_path.clone(),
+                source,
+            })?;
+        let identifier = policy_path.to_string_lossy().to_string();
+        parser
+            .parse(&identifier, &contents)
+            .map_err(|source| ExecPolicyError::ParsePolicy {
+                path: identifier,
+                source,
+            })?;
+    }
+
+    let policy = Arc::new(parser.build());
+    tracing::debug!(
+        file_count = policy_paths.len(),
+        "loaded execpolicy2 from {}",
+        policy_dir.display()
+    );
+
+    Ok(Some(policy))
+}
+
+fn evaluate_with_policy(
+    policy: &Policy,
+    command: &[String],
+    approval_policy: AskForApproval,
+) -> Option<ApprovalRequirement> {
+    let commands = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(command).unwrap_or_else(|| vec![command.to_vec()]);
+    let evaluation = policy.check_multiple(commands.iter());
+
+    match evaluation {
+        Evaluation::Match { decision, .. } => match decision {
+            Decision::Forbidden => Some(ApprovalRequirement::Forbidden {
+                reason: FORBIDDEN_REASON.to_string(),
+            }),
+            Decision::Prompt => {
+                let reason = PROMPT_REASON.to_string();
+                if matches!(approval_policy, AskForApproval::Never) {
+                    Some(ApprovalRequirement::Forbidden { reason })
+                } else {
+                    Some(ApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
+                        reason: Some(reason),
+                    })
+                }
+            }
+            Decision::Allow => Some(ApprovalRequirement::Skip),
+        },
+        Evaluation::NoMatch => None,
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn approval_requirement_for_command(
+    policy: Option<&Policy>,
+    command: &[String],
+    approval_policy: AskForApproval,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+    with_escalated_permissions: bool,
+) -> ApprovalRequirement {
+    if let Some(policy) = policy
+        && let Some(requirement) = evaluate_with_policy(policy, command, approval_policy)
+    {
+        return requirement;
+    }
+
+    if requires_initial_appoval(
+        approval_policy,
+        sandbox_policy,
+        command,
+        with_escalated_permissions,
+    ) {
+        ApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval { reason: None }
+    } else {
+        ApprovalRequirement::Skip
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::features::Feature;
+    use crate::features::Features;
+    use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
+    use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
+    use tempfile::tempdir;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn returns_none_when_feature_disabled() {
+        let features = Features::with_defaults();
+        let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
+
+        let policy = exec_policy_for(&features, temp_dir.path()).expect("policy result");
+
+        assert!(policy.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn returns_none_when_policy_dir_is_missing() {
+        let mut features = Features::with_defaults();
+        features.enable(Feature::ExecPolicyV2);
+        let temp_dir = tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
+        let missing_dir = temp_dir.path().join("missing");
+
+        let policy = exec_policy_for(&features, &missing_dir).expect("policy result");
+
+        assert!(policy.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn evaluates_bash_lc_inner_commands() {
+        let policy_src = r#"
+prefix_rule(pattern=["rm"], decision="forbidden")
+"#;
+        let mut parser = PolicyParser::new();
+        parser
+            .parse("test.codexpolicy", policy_src)
+            .expect("parse policy");
+        let policy = parser.build();
+
+        let forbidden_script = vec![
+            "bash".to_string(),
+            "-lc".to_string(),
+            "rm -rf /tmp".to_string(),
+        ];
+
+        let requirement =
+            evaluate_with_policy(&policy, &forbidden_script, AskForApproval::OnRequest)
+                .expect("expected match for forbidden command");
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            requirement,
+            ApprovalRequirement::Forbidden {
+                reason: FORBIDDEN_REASON.to_string()
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn approval_requirement_prefers_execpolicy_match() {
+        let policy_src = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["rm"], decision="prompt")"#;
+        let mut parser = PolicyParser::new();
+        parser
+            .parse("test.codexpolicy", policy_src)
+            .expect("parse policy");
+        let policy = parser.build();
+        let command = vec!["rm".to_string()];
+
+        let requirement = approval_requirement_for_command(
+            Some(&policy),
+            &command,
+            AskForApproval::OnRequest,
+            &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+            false,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            requirement,
+            ApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
+                reason: Some(PROMPT_REASON.to_string())
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn approval_requirement_respects_approval_policy() {
+        let policy_src = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["rm"], decision="prompt")"#;
+        let mut parser = PolicyParser::new();
+        parser
+            .parse("test.codexpolicy", policy_src)
+            .expect("parse policy");
+        let policy = parser.build();
+        let command = vec!["rm".to_string()];
+
+        let requirement = approval_requirement_for_command(
+            Some(&policy),
+            &command,
+            AskForApproval::Never,
+            &SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+            false,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            requirement,
+            ApprovalRequirement::Forbidden {
+                reason: PROMPT_REASON.to_string()
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn approval_requirement_falls_back_to_heuristics() {
+        let command = vec!["python".to_string()];
+
+        let requirement = approval_requirement_for_command(
+            None,
+            &command,
+            AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
+            &SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
+            false,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            requirement,
+            ApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval { reason: None }
+        );
+    }
+}

codex-rs/core/src/features.rs

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ pub enum Feature {
     ViewImageTool,
     /// Allow the model to request web searches.
     WebSearchRequest,
+    /// Gate the execpolicy2 enforcement for shell/unified exec.
+    ExecPolicyV2,
     /// Enable the model-based risk assessments for sandboxed commands.
     SandboxCommandAssessment,
     /// Create a ghost commit at each turn.
@@ -285,6 +287,12 @@ pub const FEATURES: &[FeatureSpec] = &[
         stage: Stage::Stable,
         default_enabled: false,
     },
+    FeatureSpec {
+        id: Feature::ExecPolicyV2,
+        key: "exec_policy_v2",
+        stage: Stage::Experimental,
+        default_enabled: false,
+    },
     FeatureSpec {
         id: Feature::SandboxCommandAssessment,
         key: "experimental_sandbox_command_assessment",

codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ mod client;
 mod client_common;
 pub mod codex;
 mod codex_conversation;
-pub mod powershell;
 pub use codex_conversation::CodexConversation;
 mod codex_delegate;
 mod command_safety;
@@ -25,6 +24,7 @@ mod environment_context;
 pub mod error;
 pub mod exec;
 pub mod exec_env;
+mod exec_policy;
 pub mod features;
 mod flags;
 pub mod git_info;

codex-rs/core/src/model_family.rs

@@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ pub fn find_family_for_model(slug: &str) -> Option<ModelFamily> {
                 "list_dir".to_string(),
                 "read_file".to_string(),
             ],
-            shell_type: if cfg!(windows) { ConfigShellToolType::ShellCommand } else { ConfigShellToolType::Default },
             supports_parallel_tool_calls: true,
             support_verbosity: true,
         )
@@ -177,7 +176,6 @@ pub fn find_family_for_model(slug: &str) -> Option<ModelFamily> {
             reasoning_summary_format: ReasoningSummaryFormat::Experimental,
             base_instructions: GPT_5_CODEX_INSTRUCTIONS.to_string(),
             apply_patch_tool_type: Some(ApplyPatchToolType::Freeform),
-            shell_type: if cfg!(windows) { ConfigShellToolType::ShellCommand } else { ConfigShellToolType::Default },
             support_verbosity: false,
         )
     } else if slug.starts_with("gpt-5.1") {

codex-rs/core/src/parse_command.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 use crate::bash::extract_bash_command;
 use crate::bash::try_parse_shell;
 use crate::bash::try_parse_word_only_commands_sequence;
-use crate::powershell::extract_powershell_command;
 use codex_protocol::parse_command::ParsedCommand;
 use shlex::split as shlex_split;
 use shlex::try_join as shlex_try_join;
@@ -12,11 +11,6 @@ pub fn shlex_join(tokens: &[String]) -> String {
         .unwrap_or_else(|_| "<command included NUL byte>".to_string())
 }
 
-/// Extracts the shell and script from a command, regardless of platform
-pub fn extract_shell_command(command: &[String]) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
-    extract_bash_command(command).or_else(|| extract_powershell_command(command))
-}
-
 /// DO NOT REVIEW THIS CODE BY HAND
 /// This parsing code is quite complex and not easy to hand-modify.
 /// The easiest way to iterate is to add unit tests and have Codex fix the implementation.
@@ -883,42 +877,6 @@ mod tests {
             }],
         );
     }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn powershell_command_is_stripped() {
-        assert_parsed(
-            &vec_str(&["powershell", "-Command", "Get-ChildItem"]),
-            vec![ParsedCommand::Unknown {
-                cmd: "Get-ChildItem".to_string(),
-            }],
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn pwsh_with_noprofile_and_c_alias_is_stripped() {
-        assert_parsed(
-            &vec_str(&["pwsh", "-NoProfile", "-c", "Write-Host hi"]),
-            vec![ParsedCommand::Unknown {
-                cmd: "Write-Host hi".to_string(),
-            }],
-        );
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn powershell_with_path_is_stripped() {
-        let command = if cfg!(windows) {
-            "C:\\windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
-        } else {
-            "/usr/local/bin/powershell.exe"
-        };
-
-        assert_parsed(
-            &vec_str(&[command, "-NoProfile", "-c", "Write-Host hi"]),
-            vec![ParsedCommand::Unknown {
-                cmd: "Write-Host hi".to_string(),
-            }],
-        );
-    }
 }
 
 pub fn parse_command_impl(command: &[String]) -> Vec<ParsedCommand> {
@@ -926,12 +884,6 @@ pub fn parse_command_impl(command: &[String]) -> Vec<ParsedCommand> {
         return commands;
     }
 
-    if let Some((_, script)) = extract_powershell_command(command) {
-        return vec![ParsedCommand::Unknown {
-            cmd: script.to_string(),
-        }];
-    }
-
     let normalized = normalize_tokens(command);
 
     let parts = if contains_connectors(&normalized) {
@@ -1238,7 +1190,6 @@ fn parse_find_query_and_path(tail: &[String]) -> (Option<String>, Option<String>
 }
 
 fn parse_shell_lc_commands(original: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<ParsedCommand>> {
-    // Only handle bash/zsh here; PowerShell is stripped separately without bash parsing.
     let (_, script) = extract_bash_command(original)?;
 
     if let Some(tree) = try_parse_shell(script)

codex-rs/core/src/powershell.rs

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-
-use crate::shell::ShellType;
-use crate::shell::detect_shell_type;
-
-const POWERSHELL_FLAGS: &[&str] = &["-nologo", "-noprofile", "-command", "-c"];
-
-/// Extract the PowerShell script body from an invocation such as:
-///
-/// - ["pwsh", "-NoProfile", "-Command", "Get-ChildItem -Recurse | Select-String foo"]
-/// - ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "Write-Host hi"]
-/// - ["powershell", "-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-Command", "...script..."]
-///
-/// Returns (`shell`, `script`) when the first arg is a PowerShell executable and a
-/// `-Command` (or `-c`) flag is present followed by a script string.
-pub fn extract_powershell_command(command: &[String]) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
-    if command.len() < 3 {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    let shell = &command[0];
-    if detect_shell_type(&PathBuf::from(shell)) != Some(ShellType::PowerShell) {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    // Find the first occurrence of -Command (accept common short alias -c as well)
-    let mut i = 1usize;
-    while i + 1 < command.len() {
-        let flag = &command[i];
-        // Reject unknown flags
-        if !POWERSHELL_FLAGS.contains(&flag.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str()) {
-            return None;
-        }
-        if flag.eq_ignore_ascii_case("-Command") || flag.eq_ignore_ascii_case("-c") {
-            let script = &command[i + 1];
-            return Some((shell, script.as_str()));
-        }
-        i += 1;
-    }
-    None
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::extract_powershell_command;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn extracts_basic_powershell_command() {
-        let cmd = vec![
-            "powershell".to_string(),
-            "-Command".to_string(),
-            "Write-Host hi".to_string(),
-        ];
-        let (_shell, script) = extract_powershell_command(&cmd).expect("extract");
-        assert_eq!(script, "Write-Host hi");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn extracts_lowercase_flags() {
-        let cmd = vec![
-            "powershell".to_string(),
-            "-nologo".to_string(),
-            "-command".to_string(),
-            "Write-Host hi".to_string(),
-        ];
-        let (_shell, script) = extract_powershell_command(&cmd).expect("extract");
-        assert_eq!(script, "Write-Host hi");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn extracts_full_path_powershell_command() {
-        let command = if cfg!(windows) {
-            "C:\\windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe".to_string()
-        } else {
-            "/usr/local/bin/powershell.exe".to_string()
-        };
-        let cmd = vec![command, "-Command".to_string(), "Write-Host hi".to_string()];
-        let (_shell, script) = extract_powershell_command(&cmd).expect("extract");
-        assert_eq!(script, "Write-Host hi");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn extracts_with_noprofile_and_alias() {
-        let cmd = vec![
-            "pwsh".to_string(),
-            "-NoProfile".to_string(),
-            "-c".to_string(),
-            "Get-ChildItem | Select-String foo".to_string(),
-        ];
-        let (_shell, script) = extract_powershell_command(&cmd).expect("extract");
-        assert_eq!(script, "Get-ChildItem | Select-String foo");
-    }
-}

codex-rs/core/src/shell.rs

@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ impl Shell {
                 ]
             }
             Shell::PowerShell(ps) => {
-                let mut args = vec![ps.shell_path.to_string_lossy().to_string()];
+                let mut args = vec![
+                    ps.shell_path.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
+                    "-NoLogo".to_string(),
+                ];
                 if !use_login_shell {
                     args.push("-NoProfile".to_string());
                 }
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ pub fn detect_shell_type(shell_path: &PathBuf) -> Option<ShellType> {
         Some("powershell") => Some(ShellType::PowerShell),
         _ => {
             let shell_name = shell_path.file_stem();
+
             if let Some(shell_name) = shell_name
                 && shell_name != shell_path
             {
@@ -247,14 +251,6 @@ mod detect_shell_type_tests {
             detect_shell_type(&PathBuf::from("powershell.exe")),
             Some(ShellType::PowerShell)
         );
-        assert_eq!(
-            detect_shell_type(&PathBuf::from(if cfg!(windows) {
-                "C:\\windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
-            } else {
-                "/usr/local/bin/pwsh"
-            })),
-            Some(ShellType::PowerShell)
-        );
         assert_eq!(
             detect_shell_type(&PathBuf::from("pwsh.exe")),
             Some(ShellType::PowerShell)

codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/shell.rs

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use crate::apply_patch::convert_apply_patch_to_protocol;
 use crate::codex::TurnContext;
 use crate::exec::ExecParams;
 use crate::exec_env::create_env;
+use crate::exec_policy::approval_requirement_for_command;
 use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
 use crate::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
 use crate::protocol::ExecCommandSource;
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ use crate::tools::runtimes::apply_patch::ApplyPatchRequest;
 use crate::tools::runtimes::apply_patch::ApplyPatchRuntime;
 use crate::tools::runtimes::shell::ShellRequest;
 use crate::tools::runtimes::shell::ShellRuntime;
+use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalRequirement;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolCtx;
 
 pub struct ShellHandler;
@@ -303,6 +305,17 @@ impl ShellHandler {
             env: exec_params.env.clone(),
             with_escalated_permissions: exec_params.with_escalated_permissions,
             justification: exec_params.justification.clone(),
+            approval_requirement: if is_user_shell_command {
+                ApprovalRequirement::Skip
+            } else {
+                approval_requirement_for_command(
+                    turn.exec_policy_v2.as_deref(),
+                    &exec_params.command,
+                    turn.approval_policy,
+                    &turn.sandbox_policy,
+                    exec_params.with_escalated_permissions.unwrap_or(false),
+                )
+            },
         };
         let mut orchestrator = ToolOrchestrator::new();
         let mut runtime = ShellRuntime::new();

codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs

@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@ use crate::error::get_error_message_ui;
 use crate::exec::ExecToolCallOutput;
 use crate::sandboxing::SandboxManager;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalCtx;
+use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalRequirement;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ProvidesSandboxRetryData;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxAttempt;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolCtx;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolError;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolRuntime;
+use crate::tools::sandboxing::default_approval_requirement;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
 
@@ -49,40 +51,52 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {
         let otel_cfg = codex_otel::otel_event_manager::ToolDecisionSource::Config;
 
         // 1) Approval
-        let needs_initial_approval =
-            tool.wants_initial_approval(req, approval_policy, &turn_ctx.sandbox_policy);
         let mut already_approved = false;
 
-        if needs_initial_approval {
-            let mut risk = None;
-
-            if let Some(metadata) = req.sandbox_retry_data() {
-                risk = tool_ctx
-                    .session
-                    .assess_sandbox_command(turn_ctx, &tool_ctx.call_id, &metadata.command, None)
-                    .await;
+        let requirement = tool.approval_requirement(req).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            default_approval_requirement(approval_policy, &turn_ctx.sandbox_policy)
+        });
+        match requirement {
+            ApprovalRequirement::Skip => {
+                otel.tool_decision(otel_tn, otel_ci, ReviewDecision::Approved, otel_cfg);
             }
+            ApprovalRequirement::Forbidden { reason } => {
+                return Err(ToolError::Rejected(reason));
+            }
+            ApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval { reason } => {
+                let mut risk = None;
 
-            let approval_ctx = ApprovalCtx {
-                session: tool_ctx.session,
-                turn: turn_ctx,
-                call_id: &tool_ctx.call_id,
-                retry_reason: None,
-                risk,
-            };
-            let decision = tool.start_approval_async(req, approval_ctx).await;
-
-            otel.tool_decision(otel_tn, otel_ci, decision, otel_user.clone());
-
-            match decision {
-                ReviewDecision::Denied | ReviewDecision::Abort => {
-                    return Err(ToolError::Rejected("rejected by user".to_string()));
+                if let Some(metadata) = req.sandbox_retry_data() {
+                    risk = tool_ctx
+                        .session
+                        .assess_sandbox_command(
+                            turn_ctx,
+                            &tool_ctx.call_id,
+                            &metadata.command,
+                            None,
+                        )
+                        .await;
                 }
-                ReviewDecision::Approved | ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => {}
+
+                let approval_ctx = ApprovalCtx {
+                    session: tool_ctx.session,
+                    turn: turn_ctx,
+                    call_id: &tool_ctx.call_id,
+                    retry_reason: reason,
+                    risk,
+                };
+                let decision = tool.start_approval_async(req, approval_ctx).await;
+
+                otel.tool_decision(otel_tn, otel_ci, decision, otel_user.clone());
+
+                match decision {
+                    ReviewDecision::Denied | ReviewDecision::Abort => {
+                        return Err(ToolError::Rejected("rejected by user".to_string()));
+                    }
+                    ReviewDecision::Approved | ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => {}
+                }
+                already_approved = true;
             }
-            already_approved = true;
-        } else {
-            otel.tool_decision(otel_tn, otel_ci, ReviewDecision::Approved, otel_cfg);
         }
 
         // 2) First attempt under the selected sandbox.

codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell.rs

@@ -4,13 +4,12 @@ Runtime: shell
 Executes shell requests under the orchestrator: asks for approval when needed,
 builds a CommandSpec, and runs it under the current SandboxAttempt.
 */
-use crate::command_safety::is_dangerous_command::requires_initial_appoval;
 use crate::exec::ExecToolCallOutput;
-use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use crate::sandboxing::execute_env;
 use crate::tools::runtimes::build_command_spec;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::Approvable;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalCtx;
+use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalRequirement;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ProvidesSandboxRetryData;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxAttempt;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxRetryData;
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolCtx;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolError;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ToolRuntime;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::with_cached_approval;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
 use futures::future::BoxFuture;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -33,6 +31,7 @@ pub struct ShellRequest {
     pub env: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
     pub with_escalated_permissions: Option<bool>,
     pub justification: Option<String>,
+    pub approval_requirement: ApprovalRequirement,
 }
 
 impl ProvidesSandboxRetryData for ShellRequest {
@@ -114,18 +113,8 @@ impl Approvable<ShellRequest> for ShellRuntime {
         })
     }
 
-    fn wants_initial_approval(
-        &self,
-        req: &ShellRequest,
-        policy: AskForApproval,
-        sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
-    ) -> bool {
-        requires_initial_appoval(
-            policy,
-            sandbox_policy,
-            &req.command,
-            req.with_escalated_permissions.unwrap_or(false),
-        )
+    fn approval_requirement(&self, req: &ShellRequest) -> Option<ApprovalRequirement> {
+        Some(req.approval_requirement.clone())
     }
 
     fn wants_escalated_first_attempt(&self, req: &ShellRequest) -> bool {

codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/unified_exec.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use crate::command_safety::is_dangerous_command::requires_initial_appoval;
 /*
 Runtime: unified exec
 
@@ -10,6 +9,7 @@ use crate::error::SandboxErr;
 use crate::tools::runtimes::build_command_spec;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::Approvable;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalCtx;
+use crate::tools::sandboxing::ApprovalRequirement;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::ProvidesSandboxRetryData;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxAttempt;
 use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxRetryData;
@@ -22,9 +22,7 @@ use crate::tools::sandboxing::with_cached_approval;
 use crate::unified_exec::UnifiedExecError;
 use crate::unified_exec::UnifiedExecSession;
 use crate::unified_exec::UnifiedExecSessionManager;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
 use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
-use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
 use futures::future::BoxFuture;
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -36,6 +34,7 @@ pub struct UnifiedExecRequest {
     pub env: HashMap<String, String>,
     pub with_escalated_permissions: Option<bool>,
     pub justification: Option<String>,
+    pub approval_requirement: ApprovalRequirement,
 }
 
 impl ProvidesSandboxRetryData for UnifiedExecRequest {
@@ -65,6 +64,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecRequest {
         env: HashMap<String, String>,
         with_escalated_permissions: Option<bool>,
         justification: Option<String>,
+        approval_requirement: ApprovalRequirement,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
             command,
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ impl UnifiedExecRequest {
             env,
             with_escalated_permissions,
             justification,
+            approval_requirement,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -129,18 +130,8 @@ impl Approvable<UnifiedExecRequest> for UnifiedExecRuntime<'_> {
         })
     }
 
-    fn wants_initial_approval(
-        &self,
-        req: &UnifiedExecRequest,
-        policy: AskForApproval,
-        sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
-    ) -> bool {
-        requires_initial_appoval(
-            policy,
-            sandbox_policy,
-            &req.command,
-            req.with_escalated_permissions.unwrap_or(false),
-        )
+    fn approval_requirement(&self, req: &UnifiedExecRequest) -> Option<ApprovalRequirement> {
+        Some(req.approval_requirement.clone())
     }
 
     fn wants_escalated_first_attempt(&self, req: &UnifiedExecRequest) -> bool {

codex-rs/core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs

@@ -86,6 +86,34 @@ pub(crate) struct ApprovalCtx<'a> {
     pub risk: Option<SandboxCommandAssessment>,
 }
 
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub(crate) enum ApprovalRequirement {
+    Skip,
+    NeedsApproval { reason: Option<String> },
+    Forbidden { reason: String },
+}
+
+/// Reflects the orchestrator's behavior (pre-refactor):
+/// - Never, OnFailure: do not ask
+/// - OnRequest: ask unless sandbox policy is DangerFullAccess
+/// - UnlessTrusted: always ask
+pub(crate) fn default_approval_requirement(
+    policy: AskForApproval,
+    sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
+) -> ApprovalRequirement {
+    let needs_approval = match policy {
+        AskForApproval::Never | AskForApproval::OnFailure => false,
+        AskForApproval::OnRequest => !matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
+        AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => true,
+    };
+
+    if needs_approval {
+        ApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval { reason: None }
+    } else {
+        ApprovalRequirement::Skip
+    }
+}
+
 pub(crate) trait Approvable<Req> {
     type ApprovalKey: Hash + Eq + Clone + Debug + Serialize;
 
@@ -106,22 +134,11 @@ pub(crate) trait Approvable<Req> {
         matches!(policy, AskForApproval::Never)
     }
 
-    /// Decide whether an initial user approval should be requested before the
-    /// first attempt. Defaults to the orchestrator's behavior (pre‑refactor):
-    /// - Never, OnFailure: do not ask
-    /// - OnRequest: ask unless sandbox policy is DangerFullAccess
-    /// - UnlessTrusted: always ask
-    fn wants_initial_approval(
-        &self,
-        _req: &Req,
-        policy: AskForApproval,
-        sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
-    ) -> bool {
-        match policy {
-            AskForApproval::Never | AskForApproval::OnFailure => false,
-            AskForApproval::OnRequest => !matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess),
-            AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted => true,
-        }
+    /// Override the default approval requirement. Return `Some(_)` to specify
+    /// a custom requirement, or `None` to fall back to
+    /// policy-based default.
+    fn approval_requirement(&self, _req: &Req) -> Option<ApprovalRequirement> {
+        None
     }
 
     /// Decide we can request an approval for no-sandbox execution.

codex-rs/core/src/tools/spec.rs

@@ -1292,11 +1292,7 @@ mod tests {
             "gpt-5-codex",
             &Features::with_defaults(),
             &[
-                if cfg!(windows) {
-                    "shell_command"
-                } else {
-                    "shell"
-                },
+                "shell",
                 "list_mcp_resources",
                 "list_mcp_resource_templates",
                 "read_mcp_resource",
@@ -1313,11 +1309,7 @@ mod tests {
             "gpt-5.1-codex",
             &Features::with_defaults(),
             &[
-                if cfg!(windows) {
-                    "shell_command"
-                } else {
-                    "shell"
-                },
+                "shell",
                 "list_mcp_resources",
                 "list_mcp_resource_templates",
                 "read_mcp_resource",
@@ -1392,11 +1384,7 @@ mod tests {
             "gpt-5.1-codex-mini",
             &Features::with_defaults(),
             &[
-                if cfg!(windows) {
-                    "shell_command"
-                } else {
-                    "shell"
-                },
+                "shell",
                 "list_mcp_resources",
                 "list_mcp_resource_templates",
                 "read_mcp_resource",

codex-rs/core/src/unified_exec/session_manager.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use crate::codex::TurnContext;
 use crate::exec::ExecToolCallOutput;
 use crate::exec::StreamOutput;
 use crate::exec_env::create_env;
+use crate::exec_policy::approval_requirement_for_command;
 use crate::protocol::BackgroundEventEvent;
 use crate::protocol::EventMsg;
 use crate::protocol::ExecCommandSource;
@@ -444,6 +445,13 @@ impl UnifiedExecSessionManager {
             create_env(&context.turn.shell_environment_policy),
             with_escalated_permissions,
             justification,
+            approval_requirement_for_command(
+                context.turn.exec_policy_v2.as_deref(),
+                command,
+                context.turn.approval_policy,
+                &context.turn.sandbox_policy,
+                with_escalated_permissions.unwrap_or(false),
+            ),
         );
         let tool_ctx = ToolCtx {
             session: context.session.as_ref(),

codex-rs/core/tests/suite/execpolicy2.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use codex_core::features::Feature;
+use codex_core::protocol::AskForApproval;
+use codex_core::protocol::EventMsg;
+use codex_core::protocol::Op;
+use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+use codex_protocol::config_types::ReasoningSummary;
+use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
+use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
+use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
+use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
+use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
+use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
+use core_test_support::responses::sse;
+use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
+use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
+use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
+use serde_json::json;
+use std::fs;
+
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
+async fn execpolicy2_blocks_shell_invocation() -> Result<()> {
+    let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
+        config.features.enable(Feature::ExecPolicyV2);
+        let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("policy.codexpolicy");
+        fs::write(
+            &policy_path,
+            r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["echo"], decision="forbidden")"#,
+        )
+        .expect("write policy file");
+    });
+    let server = start_mock_server().await;
+    let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
+
+    let call_id = "shell-forbidden";
+    let args = json!({
+        "command": ["echo", "blocked"],
+        "timeout_ms": 1_000,
+    });
+
+    mount_sse_once(
+        &server,
+        sse(vec![
+            ev_response_created("resp-1"),
+            ev_function_call(call_id, "shell", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
+            ev_completed("resp-1"),
+        ]),
+    )
+    .await;
+    mount_sse_once(
+        &server,
+        sse(vec![
+            ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
+            ev_completed("resp-2"),
+        ]),
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
+    test.codex
+        .submit(Op::UserTurn {
+            items: vec![UserInput::Text {
+                text: "run shell command".into(),
+            }],
+            final_output_json_schema: None,
+            cwd: test.cwd_path().to_path_buf(),
+            approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
+            sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
+            model: session_model,
+            effort: None,
+            summary: ReasoningSummary::Auto,
+        })
+        .await?;
+
+    let EventMsg::ExecCommandEnd(end) = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
+        matches!(event, EventMsg::ExecCommandEnd(_))
+    })
+    .await
+    else {
+        unreachable!()
+    };
+    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
+        matches!(event, EventMsg::TaskComplete(_))
+    })
+    .await;
+
+    assert!(
+        end.aggregated_output
+            .contains("execpolicy forbids this command"),
+        "unexpected output: {}",
+        end.aggregated_output
+    );
+
+    Ok(())
+}

codex-rs/core/tests/suite/mod.rs

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ mod compact;
 mod compact_resume_fork;
 mod deprecation_notice;
 mod exec;
+mod execpolicy2;
 mod fork_conversation;
 mod grep_files;
 mod items;

codex-rs/core/tests/suite/model_tools.rs

@@ -119,12 +119,7 @@ async fn model_selects_expected_tools() {
     assert_eq!(
         gpt5_codex_tools,
         vec![
-            if cfg!(windows) {
-                "shell_command"
-            } else {
-                "shell"
-            }
-            .to_string(),
+            "shell".to_string(),
             "list_mcp_resources".to_string(),
             "list_mcp_resource_templates".to_string(),
             "read_mcp_resource".to_string(),
@@ -138,12 +133,7 @@ async fn model_selects_expected_tools() {
     assert_eq!(
         gpt51_codex_tools,
         vec![
-            if cfg!(windows) {
-                "shell_command"
-            } else {
-                "shell"
-            }
-            .to_string(),
+            "shell".to_string(),
             "list_mcp_resources".to_string(),
             "list_mcp_resource_templates".to_string(),
             "read_mcp_resource".to_string(),

codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs

@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ impl Serialize for FunctionCallOutputPayload {
     where
         S: Serializer,
     {
-        tracing::debug!("Function call output payload: {:?}", self);
+        tracing::error!("Payload: {:?}", self);
         if let Some(items) = &self.content_items {
             items.serialize(serializer)
         } else {

codex-rs/tui/src/exec_command.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
-use codex_core::parse_command::extract_shell_command;
+use codex_core::bash::extract_bash_command;
 use dirs::home_dir;
 use shlex::try_join;
 
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ pub(crate) fn escape_command(command: &[String]) -> String {
 }
 
 pub(crate) fn strip_bash_lc_and_escape(command: &[String]) -> String {
-    if let Some((_, script)) = extract_shell_command(command) {
+    if let Some((_, script)) = extract_bash_command(command) {
         return script.to_string();
     }
     escape_command(command)